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Abstract—We apply formal methods to lay and streamline
theoretical foundations to reason about Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPSs) and cyber-physical attacks. We focus on integrity and
DoS attacks to sensors and actuators of CPSs, and on the
timing aspects of these attacks. Our contributions are threefold:
(1) we define a hybrid process calculus to model both CPSs
and cyber-physical attacks; (2) we define a threat model of
cyber-physical attacks and provide the means to assess attack
tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given attack; (3) we
formalise how to estimate the impact of a successful attack on
a CPS and investigate possible quantifications of the success
chances of an attack. We illustrate definitions and results by
means of a non-trivial engineering application.
I. INTRODUCTION
Context and motivation: Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are
integrations of networking and distributed computing systems
with physical processes that monitor and control entities in
a physical environment, with feedback loops where physical
processes affect computations and vice versa. For example, in
real-time control systems, a hierarchy of sensors, actuators
and control processing components are connected to control
stations. Different kinds of CPSs include supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA), programmable logic controllers
(PLC) and distributed control systems.
In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of attacks to the security of cyber-physical and critical
systems, e.g., manipulating sensor readings and, in general,
influencing physical processes to bring the system into a state
desired by the attacker. Many (in)famous examples have been
so impressive to make the international news, e.g.: the Stuxnet
worm, which reprogrammed PLCs of nuclear centrifuges
in Iran [5] or the attack on a sewage treatment facility in
Queensland, Australia, which manipulated the SCADA system
to release raw sewage into local rivers and parks [18].
As stated in [8], the concern for consequences at the physical
level puts CPS security apart from standard information
security, and demands for ad hoc solutions to properly address
such novel research challenges. The works that have taken up
these challenges range from proposals of different notions of
cyber-physical security and attacks (e.g., [3], [8], [11], to name
a few) to pioneering extensions to CPS security of standard
formal approaches (e.g., [3], [4], [22]). However, to the best of
our knowledge, a systematic formal approach to cyber-physical
attacks is still to be fully developed.
Background: The dynamic behaviour of the physical plant
of a CPS is often represented by means of a discrete-time
state-space model consisting of two equations of the form
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + wk and yk = Cxk + ek ,
where xk ∈ Rn is the current (physical) state, uk ∈ Rm is the
input (i.e., the control actions implemented through actuators)
and yk ∈ Rp is the output (i.e., the measurements from the
sensors). The uncertainty wk ∈ Rn and the measurement error
ek ∈ Rp represent perturbation and sensor noise, respectively,
and A, B, and C are matrices modelling the dynamics of the
physical system. Here, the next state xk+1 depends on the
current state xk and the corresponding control actions uk, at
the sampling instant k ∈ N. The state xk cannot be directly
observed: only its measurements yk can be observed.
The physical plant is supported by a communication network
through which the sensor measurements and actuator data are
exchanged with controller(s) and supervisor(s) (e.g., IDSs),
which are the cyber components (also called logics) of a CPS.
Contributions: In this paper, we focus on a formal treatment
of both integrity and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to physical
devices (sensors and actuators) of CPSs, paying particular
attention to the timing aspects of these attacks. The overall
goal of the paper is to apply formal methodologies to lay
theoretical foundations to reason about and statically detect
attacks to physical devices of CPSs.
Our contributions are threefold. The first contribution is
the definition of a hybrid process calculus, called CCPSA,
to formally specify both CPSs and cyber-physical attacks. In
CCPSA, CPSs have two components: a physical component
denoting the physical plant (also called environment) of the
system, and containing information on state variables, actuators,
sensors, evolution law, etc., and a cyber component that governs
access to sensors and actuators, channel-based communication
with other cyber components. Thus, channels are used for
logical interactions between cyber components, whereas sensors
and actuators make possible the interaction between cyber and
physical components.
CCPSA adopts a discrete notion of time [9] and it is equipped
with a labelled transition semantics (LTS) that allows us to
observe both physical events (system deadlock and violations of
safety conditions) and cyber events (channel communications).
Based on our LTS, we define two trace-based system preorders:
a trace preorder, v, and a timed variant, vm..n, for m,n ∈
N+ ∪∞, which takes into account discrepancies of execution
traces within the time interval m..n.
As a second contribution, we formalise a threat model that
specifies attacks that can manipulate sensor and/or actuator
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Fig. 1. Our threat model for CPSs
signals in order to drive a CPS into an undesired state [19].
Cyber-physical attacks typically tamper with both the physical
(sensors and actuators) and the cyber layer. In our threat model,
communication cannot be manipulated by the attacker, who
instead may compromise (unsecured) physical devices, which
is our focus. As depicted in Figure 1, our attacks may affect
directly the sensor measurements or the controller commands.
• Attacks on sensors consist of reading and eventually
replacing yk (the sensor measurements) with yak .
• Attacks on actuators consist of reading, eavesdropping and
eventually replacing the controller commands uk with uak,
affecting directly the actions the actuators may execute.
We group attacks into classes. A class of attacks takes into
account both the malicious activity I on physical devices
and the timing parameters m and n of the attack: begin and
end of the attack. We represent a class C as a total function
C ∈ [I → P(m..n)]. Intuitively, for ι ∈ I, C(ι) ⊆ m..n
denotes the set of time instants when an attack of class C
may tamper with the device ι. As observed in [11], timing is
a critical issue in CPSs because the physical state of a system
changes continuously over time, and as the system evolves in
time, some states might be more vulnerable to attacks than
others. For example, an attack launched when the target state
variable reaches a local maximum (or minimum) may have a
great impact on the whole system behaviour [12]. Furthermore,
not only the timing of the attack but also the duration of the
attack is an important parameter to be taken into consideration
in order to achieve a successful attack. For example, it may
take minutes for a chemical reactor to rupture [20], hours to
heat a tank of water or burn out a motor, and days to destroy
centrifuges [5].
In order to make security assessments on our CPSs, we adopt
a well-known approach called Generalized Non Deducibility
on Composition (GNDC) [6]. Thus, in CCPSA, we say that a
CPS Sys tolerates a cyber-physical attack A if
Sys ‖ A v Sys .
In this case, the presence of the attack A, does not affect
the whole (physical and logical) observable behaviour of the
system Sys , and the attack can be considered harmless.
On the other hand, we say that a CPS Sys is vulnerable
to a cyber-physical attack A of class C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] if
there is a time interval m′..n′ in which the attack becomes
observable (obviously, m′ ≥ m). Formally, we write:
Sys ‖ A vm′..n′ Sys .
We provide sufficient criteria to prove attack toler-
ance/vulnerability to attacks of an arbitrary class C. We define
a notion of “most powerful attack” of a given class C, Top(C),
and prove that if a CPS tolerates Top(C) then it tolerates all
attacks A of class C. Similarly, if a CPS is vulnerable to
Top(C), in the time interval m′..n′, then no attacks of class
C can affect the system out of that time interval. This is very
useful when checking for attack tolerance/vulnerability with
respect to all attacks of a given class C.
As a third contribution, we formalise how to estimate the
impact of a successful attack on a CPS and investigate possible
quantifications of the chances for an attack of being successful
when attacking a CPS. This is important since, in industrial
CPSs, before taking any countermeasure against an attack,
engineers typically first try to estimate the impact of the attack
on the system functioning (e.g., performance and security) and
weigh it against the cost of stopping the plant. If this cost is
higher than the damage caused by the attack (as is sometimes
the case), then engineers might actually decide to let the system
continue its activities even under attack. We thus provide a
metric to estimate the deviation of the system under attack
with respect to expected behaviour, according to its evolution
law and the uncertainty of the model. Then, we prove that
the impact of the most powerful attack Top(C) represents an
upper bound for the impact of any attack A of class C.
We introduce a non-trivial running example taken from an
engineering application and use it to illustrate our definitions
and cases of CPSs that tolerate certain attacks, and of CPSs
that suffer from attacks that drag them towards undesired
behaviours. We remark that while we have kept the example
simple, it is actually far from trivial and designed to describe
a wide number of attacks, as will become clear below.
All the results exhibited in the paper have been formally
proved (due to lack of space, proofs are given in the appendix).
Moreover, the behaviour of our running example and of most
of the cyber-physical attacks appearing in the paper have been
simulated in MATLAB.
Organisation: In § II, we give syntax and semantics of
CCPSA. In § III, we define cyber-physical attacks and provide
sufficient criteria for attack tolerance/vulnerability. In § IV,
we estimate the impact of attacks on CPSs, and investigate
possible quantifications of the success chances of an attack. In
§ V, we draw conclusions and discuss related and future work.
II. THE CALCULUS
In this section, we introduce our Calculus of Cyber-Physical
Systems and Attacks, CCPSA, which extends the Calculus of
Cyber-Physical Systems defined in [2] with specific features to
formalise and study attacks to physical devices.
Let us start with some preliminary notations. We use x, xk ∈
X for state variables, c, d ∈ C for communication channels,
a, ak ∈ A for actuator devices, s, sk ∈ S for sensors devices,
and p, q for both sensors and actuators (generically called
physical devices). Values, ranged over by v, v′ ∈ V , are built
from basic values, such as Booleans, integers and real numbers.
Actuator names are metavariables for actuator devices like
valve , light , etc. Similarly, sensor names are metavariables for
sensor devices, e.g., a sensor thermometer .
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Given a set of names N , we write RN to denote the set
of functions [N → R] assigning a real to each name in N .
For ξ ∈ RN , n ∈ N and v ∈ R, we write ξ[n 7→ v] for the
function ψ ∈ RN such that ψ(m) = ξ(m), for any m 6= n,
and ψ(n) = v.
Finally, we distinguish between real intervals, such as (m,n],
for m ∈ R and n ∈ R∪∞, and integer intervals, written m..n,
for m ∈ N and n ∈ N∪∞. As we will adopt a discrete notion
of time, we will use integer intervals to denote time intervals.
Definition 1 (Cyber-physical system). In CCPSA, a cyber-
physical system consists of two components: a physical
environment E that encloses all physical aspects of a system
and a cyber component P that interacts with sensors and
actuators of the system, and can communicate, via channels,
with other cyber components of the same or of other CPSs.
Given a set S of secured physical devices of E, we write
EonS P to denote the resulting CPS, and use M and N to
range over CPSs. We write EonP when S = ∅.
In a CPS EonS P , the “secured” devices in S are accessed
in a protected way and hence they cannot be attacked.1
Let us now define physical environments E and cyber
components P in order to formalise our proposal for modelling
(and reasoning about) CPSs and cyber-physical attacks.
Definition 2 (Physical environment). Let Xˆ ⊆ X be a set
of state variables, Aˆ ⊆ A be a set of actuators, and Sˆ ⊆ S
be a set of sensors. A physical environment E is an 8-tuple
〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv , safe〉, where:
• ξx ∈ RXˆ is the state function,
• ξu ∈ RAˆ is the actuator function,
• ξw ∈ RXˆ is the uncertainty function,
• evol : RXˆ × RAˆ × RXˆ → 2RXˆ is the evolution map,
• ξe ∈ RSˆ is the sensor-error function,
• meas : RXˆ × RSˆ → 2RSˆ is the measurement map,
• inv : RXˆ → {true, false} is the invariant function,
• safe : RXˆ → {true, false} is the safety function.
All the functions defining an environment are total functions.
The state function ξx returns the current value (in R)
associated to each state variable of the system. The actuator
function ξu returns the current value associated to each actuator.
The uncertainty function ξw returns the uncertainty associated
to each state variable. Thus, given a state variable x ∈ Xˆ , ξw(x)
returns the maximum distance between the real value of x and
its representation in the model. Later in the paper, we will be
interested in comparing the accuracy of two systems. Thus, for
ξw, ξ
′
w ∈ RXˆ , we will write ξw ≤ ξ′w if ξw(x) ≤ ξ′w(x), for
any x ∈ Xˆ . Similarly, we write ξw+ ξ′w to denote the function
ξ′′w ∈ RXˆ such that ξ′′w(x) = ξw(x) + ξ′w(x), for any x ∈ Xˆ .
Given a state function, an actuator function, and an un-
certainty function, the evolution map evol returns the set of
next admissible state functions. It models the evolution law of
1The presence of battery-powered devices interconnected through wireless
networks prevents the en-/decryption of all packets due to energy constraints.
the physical system, where changes made on actuators may
reflect on state variables. Since we assume an uncertainty in
our models, evol does not return a single state function but
a set of possible state functions. evol is obviously monotone
with respect to uncertainty: if ξw ≤ ξ′w then evol(ξx, ξu, ξw) ⊆
evol(ξx, ξu, ξ
′
w).
Both the state function and the actuator function are supposed
to change during the evolution of the system, whereas the uncer-
tainty function is constant. Note that, although the uncertainty
function is constant, it can be used in the evolution map in
an arbitrary way (e.g., it could have a heavier weight when a
state variable reaches extreme values). Another possibility is
to model the uncertainty function by means of a probability
distribution.
The sensor-error function ξe returns the maximum error
associated to each sensor in Sˆ. Again due to the presence of
the sensor-error function, the measurement map meas , given the
current state function, returns a set of admissible measurement
functions rather than a single one.
The invariant function inv represents the conditions that the
state variables must satisfy to allow for the evolution of the
system. A CPS whose state variables don’t satisfy the invariant
is in deadlock.
The safety function safe represents the conditions that the
state variables must satisfy to consider the CPS in a safe state.
Intuitively, if a CPS gets in an unsafe state, then its functionality
may get compromised.
In the following, we use a specific notation for the re-
placement of a single component of an environment with
a new one of the same kind; for instance, for E =
〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv , safe〉, we write E[ξw ← ξ′w]
to denote 〈ξx, ξu, ξ′w, evol , ξe,meas, inv , safe〉.
Let us now introduce a running example to illustrate our
approach. We remark that while we have kept the example
simple, it is actually far from trivial and designed to describe a
wide number of attacks. A more complex example (say, with n
sensors and m actuators) wouldn’t have been more instructive
but just made the paper more dense.
Example 1 (Physical environment of the CPS Sys). Consider a
CPS Sys in which the temperature of an engine is maintained
within a specific range by means of a cooling system. The
physical environment Env of Sys is constituted by: (i) a state
variable temp containing the current temperature of the engine,
and a state variable stress keeping track of the level of stress
of the mechanical parts of the engine due to high temperatures
(exceeding 9.9 degrees); this integer variable ranges from 0,
meaning no stress, to 5, for high stress; (ii) an actuator cool
to turn on/off the cooling system; (iii) a sensor st (such as a
thermometer or a thermocouple) measuring the temperature
of the engine; (iv) an uncertainty δ = 0.4 associated to the
only variable temp; (v) the evolution law for the two state
variables: the variable temp is increased (resp., is decreased)
of one degree per time unit if the cooling system is inactive
(resp., active), whereas the variable stress contains an integer
that is increased each time the current temperature is above
3
9.9 degrees, and dropped to 0 otherwise; (vi) an error  = 0.1
associated to the only sensor st; (vii) a measurement map to
get the values detected by sensor st, up to its error ; (viii) an
invariant function saying that the system gets faulty when the
temperature of the engine gets out of the range [0, 50]; (ix) a
safety function to say that the system moves to an unsafe state
when the level of stress reaches the threshold 5.
Formally, Env = 〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv〉 with:
• ξx ∈ R{temp,stress} and ξx(temp) = 0 and ξx(stress)=0;
• ξu ∈ R{cool} and ξu(cool) = off; for the sake of simplicity,
we can assume ξu to be a mapping {cool} → {on, off}
such that ξu(cool) = off if ξu(cool) ≥ 0, and ξu(cool) =
on if ξu(cool) < 0;
• ξw∈R{temp,stress}, ξw(temp)=0.4=δ and ξw(stress)=0;
• evol(ξix, ξ
i
u, ξw) is the set of ξ ∈ R{temp,stress} such that:
– ξ(temp) = ξix(temp) + heat(ξiu, cool) + γ, with γ ∈
[−δ,+δ] and heat(ξiu, cool) = −1 if ξiu(cool) = on
(active cooling), and heat(ξiu, cool) = +1 if ξ
i
u(cool) =
off (inactive cooling);
– ξ(stress) = min(5 , ξix(stress)+1) if ξix(temp) > 9.9;
ξ(stress) = 0, otherwise;
• ξe ∈ R{st} and ξe(st) = 0.1 = ;
• meas(ξix, ξe)=
{
ξ : ξ(st)∈[ξix(temp)− , ξix(temp)+]
}
;
• inv(ξx) = true if 0 ≤ ξx(temp) ≤ 50; inv(ξx) = false,
otherwise.
• safe(ξx) = true if ξx(stress) < 5; safe(ξx) = false, if
ξx(stress) ≥ 5 (the maximum value for stress is 5).
Let us now formalise the cyber component of CPSs in
CCPSA. Basically, we extend the timed process algebra TPL
of [9] with two main ingredients:
• two different constructs to read values detected at sensors
and write values on actuators, respectively;
• special constructs to represent malicious activities on
physical devices.
The remaining constructs are the same as those of TPL.
Definition 3 (Processes). Processes are defined as follows:
P,Q ::= nil
∣∣ idle.P ∣∣ P ‖ Q ∣∣ timeoutbpi.P cQ ∣∣
if (b) {P} else {Q} ∣∣ P\c ∣∣ H〈w˜〉.
We write nil for the terminated process. The process idle.P
sleeps for one time unit and then continues as P . We write
P ‖ Q to denote the parallel composition of concurrent
threadsP and Q. The process timeoutbpi.P cQ, with
pi ∈ {snd c〈v〉, rcv c(x), read s(x),write a〈v〉, read Ep(x),
write Ep〈v〉}, denotes prefixing with timeout. Thus,
timeoutbsnd c〈v〉.P cQ sends the value v on channel c
and, after that, it continues as P ; otherwise, after one time
unit, it evolves into Q. The process timeoutbrcv c(x).P cQ
is the obvious counterpart for reception. The process
timeoutbread s(x).P cQ reads the values detected by the
sensor s, whereas timeoutbwrite a〈v〉.P cQ writes on the
actuator a. For pi ∈ {read Ep(x),write Ep〈v〉}, the process
timeoutbpi.P cQ denotes the reading and the writing,
respectively, of the physical device p (sensor or actuator)
made by the attack. Thus, in CCPSA, attack processes have
specific constructs to interact with physical devices.
The process P\c is the channel restriction operator of CCS.
It is quantified over the set C of communication channels but we
sometimes write P\{c1, c2, . . . , cn} to mean P\c1\c2 · · · \cn.
The process if (b) {P} else {Q} is the standard conditional,
where b is a decidable guard. In processes of the form idle.Q
and timeoutbpi.P cQ, the occurrence of Q is said to be time-
guarded. The process H〈w˜〉 denotes (guarded) recursion. We
assume a set of process identifiers ranged over by H,H1, H2.
We write H〈w1, . . . , wk〉 to denote a recursive process H
defined via an equation H(x1, . . . , xk) = P , where (i) the
tuple x1, . . . , xk contains all the variables that appear free
in P , and (ii) P contains only guarded occurrences of the
process identifiers, such as H itself. We say that recursion is
time-guarded if P contains only time-guarded occurrences of
the process identifiers. Unless explicitly stated our recursive
processes are always time-guarded.
In the two constructs timeoutbrcv c(x).P cQ and
timeoutbreadµ(x).P cQ, with µ ∈ {p, Ep}, the variable
x is said to be bound. This gives rise to the standard notions
of free/bound (process) variables and α-conversion. A term is
closed if it does not contain free variables, and we assume
to always work with closed processes: the absence of free
variables is preserved at run-time. As further notation, we
write T{v/x} for the substitution of all occurrences of the the
free variable x in T with the value v.
Note that in CCPSA, a processes might use sensors and/or
actuators which are not defined in the environment. To rule
out ill-formed CPSs, we use the following definition.
Definition 4 (Well-formedness). Given a process P and an
environment E = 〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv , safe〉, the
CPS EonP is well-formed if: (i) for any sensor s mentioned
in P , the function ξe is defined on s; (ii) for any actuator a
mentioned in P , the function ξu is defined on a.
Hereafter, we will always work with well-formed CPSs.
Finally, we adopt some notational conventions. To model
time-persistent prefixing, we write pi.P for the process defined
via the equation Rcv = timeoutbpi.P cRcv , where Rcv does
not occur in P . We write timeoutbpicQ as an abbreviation
for timeoutbpi.nilcQ, and timeoutbpi.P c as an abbreviation for
timeoutbpi.P cnil. We write snd c (resp., rcv c) when channel c
is used for pure synchronisation. For k ≥ 0, we write idlek.P
as a shorthand for idle.idle. . . . idle.P , where the prefix idle
appears k consecutive times. We write if (b) {P} instead of
if (b) {P} else {nil}. Let M = EonS P , we write M ‖ Q for
EonS (P ‖ Q), and M\c for EonS P\c.
We can now finalise our running example.
Example 2 (Cyber component of the CPS Sys). Let us
define the cyber component of the CPS Sys described in
Example 1. We define two parallel processes: Ctrl and
IDS . The former models the controller activity, consisting in
reading the temperature sensor and in governing the cooling
system via its actuator, whereas the latter models a simple
4
time
0 10 20 30 40 50
a
ct
ua
l t
em
pe
ra
tu
re
 (d
eg
)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Fig. 2. Three possible evolutions of the CPS of Example 2.
intrusion detection system that attempts to detect and signal
abnormal behaviours of the system. Intuitively, Ctrl senses the
temperature of the engine at each time slot. When the sensed
temperature is above 10 degrees, the controller activates the
coolant. The cooling activity is maintained for 5 consecutive
time units. After that time, the controller synchronises with the
IDS component via a private channel sync, and then waits for
instructions, via a channel ins . The IDS component checks
whether the sensed temperature is still above 10. If this is the
case, it sends an alarm of “high temperature”, via a specific
channel, and then says to Ctrl to keep cooling for other 5
time units; otherwise, if the temperature is not above 10, the
IDS component requires Ctrl to stop the cooling activity.
Ctrl = read st(x).if (x > 10) {Cooling} else {idle.Ctrl}
Cooling = write cool〈on〉.idle5.Check
Check = snd sync.rcv ins(y).if (y = keep_cooling)
{idle5.Check} else {write cool〈off〉.idle.Ctrl}
IDS = rcv sync.read st(x).if (x > 10)
{snd alarm〈high_temp〉.snd ins〈keep_cooling〉.
idle.IDS} else {snd ins〈stop〉.idle.IDS} .
Thus, the whole CPS is defined as:
Sys = Env on (Ctrl ‖ IDS )\{sync, ins} ,
where Env is the physical environment defined in Example 1.
We remark that, for the sake of simplicity, our IDS component
is quite basic: for instance, it does not check wether the
temperature is too low. However, it is straightforward to replace
it with a more sophisticated one, containing more informative
tests on sensor values and/or on actuators commands.
A. Labelled transition semantics
In this section, we provide the dynamics of CCPSA in terms
of a labelled transition system (LTS) in the SOS style of Plotkin.
Definition 5 introduces auxiliary operators on environments.
Definition 5. Let E = 〈ξx, ξu, ξw, evol , ξe,meas, inv , safe〉.
• read_sensor(E, s) def= {ξ(s) : ξ ∈ meas(ξx, ξe)},
• update_act(E, a, v) def= E[ξu ← ξu[a 7→ v]],
• next(E) def=
⋃
ξ∈evol(ξx,ξu,ξw){E[ξx ← ξ]},
• inv(E) def= inv(ξx),
• safe(E) def= safe(ξx).
The operator read_sensor(E, s) returns the set of possible
measurements detected by sensor s in the environment E; it
returns a set of possible values rather than a single value due to
the error ξe(s) of sensor s. update_act(E, a, v) returns the new
environment in which the actuator function is updated in such
a manner to associate the actuator a with the value v. next(E)
returns the set of the next admissible environments reachable
from E, by an application of evol . inv(E) checks whether
the invariant is satisfied by the current values of the state
variables (here, abusing notation, we overload the meaning of
the function inv ). safe(E) checks whether the safety conditions
are satisfied by the current values of the state variables.
In Table I, we provide transition rules for processes. Here,
the meta-variable λ ranges over labels in the set {idle, τ, cv, cv,
a!v, s?v, Ep!v, Ep?v, τ :p}. Rules (Outp), (Inpp) and (Com) serve
to model channel communication, on some channel c. Rules
(Write) and (Read) denote the writing/reading of some data on
the physical device p. Rule (ESensWrite E) models an integrity
attack on sensor s, where the controller of s is supplied with a
fake value v provided by the attack. Rule (EActRead E) models
a DoS attack to the actuator a, where the update request of the
controller is intercepted by the attacker and it never reaches the
actuator. Rule (Par) propagates untimed actions over parallel
components. Rules (Res), (Rec), (Then) and (Else) are standard.
The following four rules model the passage of time. The
symmetric counterparts of rules (Com) and (Par) are omitted.
In Table II, we lift the transition rules from processes to
systems. Except for rule (Deadlock), all rules have a common
premise inv(E): a system can evolve only if the invariant
is satisfied. Here, actions, ranged over by α, are in the
set {τ, cv, cv, idle, deadlock, unsafe}. These actions denote:
internal activities (τ ); logical activities, more precisely, channel
transmission (cv and cv); the passage of time (idle); and two
specific physical events: system deadlock (deadlock) and the
violation of the safety conditions (unsafe). Rules (Out) and (Inp)
model transmission and reception, with an external system,
on a channel c. Rule (SensReadSec) models the reading of
the current data detected at a secured sensor s, whereas rule
(SensReadUnsec) models the reading of an unsecured sensor s.
In this case, since the sensor is not secured, the presence of a
malicious action Es!w prevents the reading of the sensor. We
already said that rule (ESensWrite E) of Table I models integrity
attacks on an unsecured sensor s, however, together with rule
(SensReadUnsec), it also serves to model DoS attacks on an
unsecured sensor s, as the controller of s cannot read its correct
value if the attacker is currently supplying a fake value for it.
Rule (ESensRead E) allows the attacker to read the confidential
value detected at an unsecured sensor s. Rule (ActWriteSec)
models the writing of a value v on a secured actuator a,
whereas rule (ActWriteUnsec) models the writing on a unsecured
actuator a. Again, if the actuator is unsecured, the presence of
an attack (capable of performing an action Ea?v) prevents
the correct access to the actuator by the controller. Rule
(EActWrite E) models an integrity attack to an unsecured actua-
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TABLE I
LTS FOR PROCESSES
(Outp)
−
timeoutbsnd c〈v〉.P cQ cv−−−→ P
(Inpp)
−
timeoutbrcv c(x).P cQ cv−−−→ P{v/x}
(Com) P
cv−−−→ P ′ Q cv−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q τ−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
(Par)
P
λ−−→ P ′ λ 6= idle
P ‖ Q λ−−→ P ′ ‖ Q
(Write)
µ ∈ {p, Ep}
timeoutbwriteµ〈v〉.P cQ µ!v−−−−→ P
(Read)
µ ∈ {p, Ep}
timeoutbreadµ(x).P cQ µ?v−−−−→ P{v/x}
(ESensWrite E) P
Es!v−−−−→ P ′ Q s?v−−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q τ :s−−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
(EActRead E) P
a!v−−−→ P ′ Q Ea?v−−−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q τ :a−−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
(Res)
P
λ−−→ P ′ λ 6∈ {cv, cv}
P\c λ−−→ P ′\c
(Rec)
P{w˜/˜x} λ−−→ Q H(x˜) = P
H〈w˜〉 λ−−→ Q
(Then)
JbK = true P λ−−→ P ′
if (b) {P} else {Q} λ−−→ P ′
(Else)
JbK = false Q λ−−→ Q′
if (b) {P} else {Q} λ−−→ Q′
(TimeNil)
−
nil
idle−−−→ nil
(Delay)
−
idle.P
idle−−−→ P
(Timeout)
−
timeoutbpi.P cQ idle−−−→ Q
(TimePar)
P
idle−−−→ P ′ Q idle−−−→ Q′
P ‖ Q idle−−−→ P ′ ‖ Q′
tor a, where the attack updates the actuator with a fake value.
Note that our operational semantics ensures a preemptive
power to prefixes of the form write Ep〈v〉 and read Ep(x) on
unsecured devices p. This because an attack process can always
prevent the regular access to a unsecured physical device
(sensor or actuator) by its controller.
Proposition 1 (Attack preemptiveness). Let M = EonS P .
• If there is Q such that P
Es!v−−−−→ Q, with s 6∈ S, then
there is no M ′ such that M
τ−−→ M ′ by an application
of the rule (SensReadUnsec).
• If there is Q such that P
Ea?v−−−−→ Q, with a 6∈ S, then
there is no M ′ such that M
τ−−→ M ′ by an application
of the rule (ActWriteUnsec).
Rule (Tau) lifts non-observable actions from processes to
systems. This includes communications channels and attacks’
accesses to unsecured physical devices. A similar lifting occurs
in rule (Time) for timed actions, where next(E) returns the set
of possible environments for the next time slot. Thus, by an
application of rule (Time) a CPS moves to the next physical
state, in the next time slot. Rule (Deadlock) is introduced to
signal the violation of the invariant. When the invariant is
violated, a system deadlock occurs and then, in CCPSA, the
system emits a special action deadlock, forever. Similarly,
rule (Safety) is introduced to detect the violation of safety
conditions. In this case, the system may emit a special action
unsafe and then continue its evolution.
Now, having defined the actions that can be performed by
a system, we can easily concatenate these actions to define
the possible execution traces of the system. Formally, given
a trace t = α1 . . . αn, we will write
t−−→ as an abbreviation
for
α1−−−→ . . . αn−−−→. In the following, we will use the function
#idle(t) to get the number of occurrences of the action idle in t.
The notion of trace allows us to provide a formal definition
of soundness for CPSs: a CPS is said to be sound if it never
deadlocks and never violates the safety conditions.
Definition 6 (System soundness). Let M be a well-formed
CPS. We say that M is sound if whenever M
t−−→ M ′, for
some t, both actions deadlock and unsafe never occur in t.
In our security analysis, we will focus on sound CPSs. For
instance, Proposition 2 says that our running example Sys is
sound and it never transmits on the channel alarm .
Proposition 2. Let Sys be the CPS defined in Example 2. If
Sys
t−−→ Sys ′, for some trace t=α1 . . . αn, then αi ∈ {τ, idle},
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Actually, we can be quite precise on the temperature reached
by Sys before and after the cooling: in each of the 5 rounds
of cooling, the temperature will drop of a value laying in the
real interval [1−δ, 1+δ], where δ is the uncertainty.
Proposition 3. Let Sys be the CPS defined in Example 2. For
any execution trace of Sys , we have:
• when Sys turns on the cooling, the value of the state
variable temp ranges over (9.9 , 11.5];
• when Sys turns off the cooling, the value of the variable
temp ranges over (2.9, 8.5].
B. Behavioural semantics
We recall that the observable activities in CCPSA are: time
passing, system deadlock, violation of safety conditions, and
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TABLE II
LTS FOR CPSS
(Out)
P
cv−−−→ P ′ inv(E)
EonS P
cv−−−→ EonS P ′
(Inp)
P
cv−−−→ P ′ inv(E)
EonS P
cv−−−→ EonS P ′
(SensReadSec)
P
s?v−−−→ P ′ s ∈ S inv(E) v ∈ read_sensor(E, s)
EonS P
τ−−→ EonS P ′
(SensReadUnsec) P
s?v−−−→ P ′ s 6∈ S P Es!v−−−−→6 inv(E) v ∈ read_sensor(E, s)
EonS P
τ−−→ EonS P ′
(ESensRead E) P
Es?v−−−−→ P ′ s 6∈ S inv(E) v ∈ read_sensor(E, s)
EonS P
τ−−→ EonS P ′
(ActWriteSec)
P
a!v−−−→ P ′ a ∈ S inv(E) E′ = update_act(E, a, v)
EonS P
τ−−→ E′onS P ′
(ActWriteUnsec) P
a!v−−−→ P ′ a 6∈ S P Ea?v−−−−→6 inv(E) E′ = update_act(E, a, v)
EonS P
τ−−→ E′onS P ′
(EActWrite E) P
Ea!v−−−−→ P ′ a 6∈ S inv(E) E′ = update_act(E, a, v)
EonS P
τ−−→ E′onS P ′
(Tau)
(P
τ−−→ P ′) ∨ (P τ :p−−−→ P ′ p 6∈ S) inv(E)
EonS P
τ−−→ EonS P ′
(Deadlock)
¬ inv(E)
EonS P
deadlock−−−−−−→ EonS P
(Time)
P
idle−−−→ P ′ EonS P τ−−→6 inv(E) E′ ∈ next(E)
EonS P
idle−−−→ E′onS P ′
(Safety)
¬ safe(E) inv(E)
EonS P
unsafe−−−−−→ EonS P
channel communication. Having defined a labelled transition
semantics, we are ready to formalise our behavioural semantics,
based on execution traces.
We adopt a standard notation for weak transitions: we write
=⇒ for ( τ−−→)∗, whereas α==⇒ means =⇒ α−−→=⇒, and finally
αˆ
=⇒ denotes =⇒ if α = τ and α=⇒ otherwise. Given a trace
t = α1. . .αn, we write
t−−→ for α1−−−→ . . . αn−−−→, and tˆ==⇒ as
an abbreviation for α̂1===⇒ . . . α̂n===⇒.
Definition 7 (Trace preorder). We write M v N if whenever
M
t−−→M ′, for some t, there is N ′ such that N tˆ==⇒ N ′.
Remark 1. Unlike standard trace semantics, our trace preorder
is able to observe deadlock thanks to the presence of the rule
(Deadlock) and the special action deadlock: if M v N and M
eventually deadlocks then also N must eventually deadlock.
As we are interested in examining timing aspects of attacks,
such as beginning and duration, we propose a timed variant of
v up to (a possibly infinite) time interval. Intuitively, we write
M vm..n N if the CPS N simulates the execution traces of
M , except for the time interval m..n.
Definition 8 (Trace preorder up to a time interval). We write
M vm..n N , for m ∈ N+ and n ∈ N+ ∪∞, with m ≤ n, if
the following conditions hold:
• m is the minimum integer for which there is a trace t,
with #idle(t) = m− 1, such that M t−−→ and N 6 tˆ==⇒;
• n is the infimum element of N+ ∪∞, n ≥ m, such that
whenever M
t1−−→M ′, with #idle(t1) = n− 1, there is
t2, with #idle(t1) = #idle(t2), such that N
t2−−→ N ′, for
some N ′, and M ′ v N ′.
In the second item, note that inf(∅) =∞. Thus, if M vm..∞
N then N simulates M only in the first m− 1 time slots.
Finally, note that we could have equipped CCPSA with
a (bi)simulation-based behavioural semantics rather than a
trace-based one, as done in [2] for a core of CCPSA with no
security features; however, our trace semantics is simpler than
(bi)simulation and it is sensitive to deadlocks of CPSs. Thus,
it is fully adequate for the purposes of this paper.
III. CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS
In this section, we use CCPSA to formalise a threat model
where attacks can manipulate sensor and/or actuator signals in
order to drive a sound CPS into an undesired state [19]. An
attack may have different levels of access to physical devices
depending on the model assumed. For example, it might be
able to get read access to the sensors but not write access; or it
might get write-only access to the actuators but not read-access.
This level of granularity is very important to model precisely
how attacks can affect a CPS [4]. For simplicity, in this paper
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we don’t represent attacks on communication channels as our
focus is on attacks to physical devices.
The syntax of our cyber-physical attack is a slight restriction
of that for processes: in terms of the form timeoutbpi.P cQ,
we require pi ∈ {write Ep〈v〉, read Ep(x)}. Thus, we provide a
syntactic way to distinguish attacks from genuine processes.
Definition 9 (Honest system). A CPS EonS P is honest if P
is honest, where P is honest if it does not contain prefixes of
the form write Ep〈v〉 or read Ep(x).
We group cyber-physical attacks in classes that describe
both the malicious activity and the timing aspects of the attack.
Thus, let I be a set of malicious activities on a number of
physical devices, m ∈ N+ be the time slot when an attack
starts, and n ∈ N+ ∪∞ be the time slot when the attack ends,
we say that an attack A is of class C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] if:
(1) all possible malicious actions of A coincide with those
contained in I, (2) the first of those actions may occur in the
m-th time slot (i.e., after m−1 idle-actions), and (3) the last
of those actions may occur in the n-th time slot (i.e., after
n−1 idle-actions). Actually, for ι ∈ I , C(ι) returns a (possibly
empty) set of time instants when the attack tamper with the
device ι; this set is contained in m..n. A class C is always a
total function.
Definition 10 (Class of attacks). Let I = {Ep? : p ∈ S ∪A}∪
{Ep! : p ∈ S ∪A} be the set of all possible malicious activities
on physical devices. Let m ∈ N+, n ∈ N+ ∪∞, with m ≤ n.
An attack A is of class C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] whenever:
• C(ι) = {k : A t−−→ ιv−−→ A′ ∧ k = #idle(t) + 1}, for ι ∈ I;
• m = inf{ k : k ∈ C(ι) ∧ ι ∈ I };
• n = sup{ k : k ∈ C(ι) ∧ ι ∈ I }.
According to the approach proposed in [6], we can say
that an attack A affects a sound CPS M if the execution of
the composed system M ‖ A differs from that of the original
system M , in an observable manner. Basically, a cyber-physical
attack can influence the system under attack in at least two
different ways:
• The system M ‖ A might deadlock when M may not;
this means that the attack A affects the availability of the
system. We recall that in the context of CPSs, deadlock
is a particular severe physical event.
• The system M ‖ A might have non-genuine execution
traces containing observables (violations of safety con-
ditions or communications on channels) that cannot be
reproduced by M ; here the attack affects the integrity of
the system behaviour.
Definition 11 (Attack tolerance/vulnerability). Let M be an
honest and sound CPS. We say that M is tolerant to an attack
A if M ‖ A v M . We say M is vulnerable to an attack A if
there is a time interval m..n, with m ∈ N+ and n ∈ N+ ∪∞,
such that M ‖ A vm..n M .
Thus, if a system M is vulnerable to an attack A of class
C ∈ [I → P(m..n)], during the time interval m′..n′, then
the attack operates during the interval m..n but it influences
the system under attack in the time interval m′..n′ (obviously,
m′ ≥ m). If n′ is finite we have a temporary attack, otherwise
we have a permanent attack. Furthermore, if m′ − n is big
enough and n − m is small, then we have a quick nasty
attack that affects the system late enough to allow attack
camouflages [8]. On the other hand, if m′ is significantly
smaller than n, then the attack affects the observable behaviour
of the system well before its termination and the CPS has good
chances of undertaking countermeasures to stop the attack.
Finally, if M ‖ A t−−→ deadlock−−−−−−−→, for some trace t, the attack
A is called lethal, as it is capable to halt (deadlock) the CPS
M . This is obviously a permanent attack.
Note that, according to Definition 11, the tolerance (or
vulnerability) of a CPS also depends on the capability of
the IDS component to detect and signal undesired physical
behaviours. In fact, the IDS component might be designed to
detect abnormal physical behaviours going well further than
deadlocks and violations of safety conditions.
In the following, we say that an attack is stealthy if it is able
to drive the CPS under attack into an incorrect physical state
(either deadlock or violation of the safety conditions) without
being noticed by the IDS component.
In the rest of this section, we present a number of different
attacks to the CPS Sys described in Example 2.
Example 3. Consider the following DoS/Integrity attack on the
(controller of) the actuator cool , of class C ∈ [I → P(m..m)]
with C(Ecool?) = C(Ecool!) = {m} and C(ι) = ∅, for ι 6∈
{Ecool?, Ecool!}; we call the attack Am:
idlem−1.timeoutbread Ecool(x).if(x=off){write Ecool〈off〉}c.
Here, the attack Am operates exclusively in the m-th time
slot, when it tries to steal the cooling command (on or off)
coming from the controller, and fabricates a fake command
to turn off the cooling system. In practice, if the controller
sends a command to turn off the coolant, nothing bad will
happen as the attack will put the same message back. When
the controller sends (in the m-th time slot) a command to
turn the cooling on, the attack will drop the command. We
recall that the controller will turn on the cooling only if the
sensed temperature is greater than 10 (and hence temp > 9.9);
this may happen only if m > 8. Since the command to turn
the cooling on is never re-sent by Ctrl , the temperature will
continue to rise, and after 4 time units the system will violate
the safety conditions emitting an action unsafe, while the IDS
component will start sending alarms every 5 time units, until
the whole system deadlocks because the temperature reaches
the threshold of 50 degrees.
Proposition 4. Let Sys be the CPS defined in Example 2, and
Am be the attack defined in Example 3. Then,
• Sys ‖ Am v Sys , for m ≤ 8,
• Sys ‖ Am vm+4..∞ Sys , for m > 8.
In this case, the IDS component of Sys is effective enough
to detect the attack with only one time unit delay.
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Example 4. Consider the following DoS/Integrity attack to
the (controller of) sensor st, of class C ∈ [I → P(2..∞)]
such that C(Est?) = {2}, C(Est!) = 2..∞ and C(ι) = ∅, for
ι 6∈ {Est!, Est?}:
A = idle.timeoutbread Est(x).B〈x〉c
B(y) = timeoutbwrite Est〈y〉.idle.B〈y〉cB〈y〉
Here, the attack A does the following actions in sequence: (i)
she sleeps for one time unit, (ii) in the following time slot, she
reads the current temperature v at sensor st, and (iii) for the
rest of her life, she keeps sending the same temperature v to
the controller of st. In the presence of this attack, the process
Ctrl never activates the Cooling component (and, hence, nor
the IDS component, which is the only one which could send an
alarm) as it will always detect a temperature below 10. Thus,
the compound system Sys ‖ A will move to an unsafe state
until the invariant will be violated and the system will deadlock.
Indeed, in the worst scenario, after d 9.91+δ e = d 9.91.4e = 8 idle-
actions (in the 9-th time slot) the value of temp will be above
9.9, and after further 5 idle-actions (in the 14-th time slot) the
system will violate the safety conditions emitting an unsafe
action. After = d 501.4e = 36 idle-actions, in the 37-th time
slot, the invariant may be broken because the state variable
temp may reach 50.4 degrees, and the system will also emit a
deadlock action. Thus, Sys ‖ A v14..∞ Sys . This is a lethal
attack, as it causes a shut down of the system. It is also a
stealthy attack as it remains unnoticed until the end.
In this attack, the IDS component is completely ineffective
as the sensor used by the component is compromised, and
there is not way for the IDS to understand whether the
sensor is under attack. A more sophisticated IDS might
have a representation of the plant to recognise abnormal
evolutions of the sensed temperature. In such case, the IDS
might switch on a second sensor, hoping that this one has not
been compromised yet. Another possibility for the designer of
the CPS is to secure the sensor. Although this is not always
possible, as encryption/decryption of all packets depends on
energy constraints of the device.
Our semantics ensures that secured devices cannot be
attacked, as stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let M = EonS P be an honest and sound CPS.
Let C ∈ [I → P(m..n)], with {p : C(Ep?)∪C(Ep!) 6= ∅} ⊆ S .
Then M ‖ A vM , for any attack A of class C.
Now, let us examine a similar but less severe attack.
Example 5. Consider the following DoS/Integrity attack to
the controller of sensor st, of class C ∈ [I → P(1..n)], for
n > 0, with C(Est!) = C(Est?) = 1..n and C(ι) = ∅, for
ι 6∈ {Est!, Est?}:
An = timeoutbread Est(x).timeoutb{write Est〈x−2〉.
idle.An−1cAn−1cAn−1
with A0 = nil. In this attack, for n consecutive time slots,
An sends to the controller the current sensed temperature
decreased by an offset 2. The effect of this attack on the system
depends on the duration n of the attack itself:
• for n ≤ 8, the attack is harmless as the variable temp
may not reach a (critical) temperature above 9.9;
• for n = 9, the variable temp might reach a temperature
above 9.9 in the 9-th time slot, and the attack would delay
the activation of the cooling system of one time slot; as
a consequence, the system might get into an unsafe state
in the time slots 14 and 15, but no alarm will be fired.
• for n ≥ 10, the system may get into an unsafe state in the
time slot 14 and in the following n − 7 time slots; this
is not a stealthy attack as the IDS will fire the alarm at
most two time slots later (in the 16-th time slot); this is
a temporary attack which ends in the time slot n+ 7.
Proposition 6. Let Sys be the CPS defined in Example 2, and
An be the attack defined in Example 5. Then:
• Sys ‖ An v Sys , for n ≤ 8,
• Sys ‖ An v14..15 Sys , for n = 9,
• Sys ‖ An v14..n+7 Sys , for n ≥ 10.
A. A technique for proving attack tolerance/vulnerability
In this subsection, we provide sufficient criteria to prove
attack tolerance/vulnerability to attacks of an arbitrary class C.
Actually, we do more than that, we provide sufficient criteria
to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability to all attacks of a class
C ′ which is somehow “weaker” than a given class C.
Definition 12. Let C1, C2 ∈ [I → P(m..n)] be two classes of
attacks. We say that C1 is weaker than C2, written C1  C2,
if C1(ι) ⊆ C2(ι), for any ι ∈ I.
The idea is to define a notion of most powerful attack (also
called top attacker) of a given class C, such that, if a CPS
M tolerates the most powerful attack of class C then it also
tolerates any attack of class C ′, with C ′  C. We will provide
a similar condition for attack vulnerability: let M be a CPS
vulnerable to Top(C) in the time interval m1..n1; then, for
any attack A of class C ′, with C ′  C, if M is vulnerable to
A then it is so for a smaller time interval m2..n2 ⊆ m1..n1.
Our notion of top attacker has two extra ingredients with
respect to the cyber-physical attacks seen up to now: (i)
nondeterminism, and (ii) time-unguarded recursive processes.
This extra power of the top attacker is not a problem as we
are looking for sufficient criteria.
For what concerns nondeterminism, we assume a generic pro-
cedure rnd() that given an arbitrary set Z returns an element of
Z chosen in a nondeterministic manner. This procedure allows
us to express nondeterministic choice, P⊕Q, as an abbreviation
for the process if (rnd({true, false})) {P} else {Q}. Thus, let
ι ∈ {Ep? : p ∈ S ∪ A} ∪ {Ep! : p ∈ S ∪ A}, m ∈ N+,
n ∈ N+ ∪ ∞, with m ≤ n, and T ⊆ m..n, we define the
attack process Att(ι, k, T ) as the attack which may achieve
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the malicious activity ι, at the time slot k, and which tries to
do the same in all subsequent time slots of T . Formally,
Att(Ep?, k, T ) =
if (k ∈ T ) {(timeoutbread Ep?(x).Att(Ep?, k, T )c
Att(Ep?, k+1, T )) ⊕ idle.Att(Ep?, k+1, T )} else
if (k < sup(T )) {idle.Att(Ep?, k+1, T )} else {nil}
Att(Ep!, k, T ) =
if (k ∈ T ) {(timeoutbwrite Ep!〈rnd(R)〉.Att(Ep!, k, T )c
Att(Ep!, k+1, T )) ⊕ idle.Att(Ep!, k+1, T )} else
if (k < sup(T )) {idle.Att(Ep!, k+1, T )} else {nil} .
Note that for T = ∅ we assume sup(T ) = −∞.
We can now use the definition above to formalise the notion
of most powerful attack of a given class C.
Definition 13 (Top attacker). Let C ∈ [I → P(m..n)] be a
class of attacks. We define
Top(C) =
∏
ι∈I Att(ι, 1, C(ι))
as the most powerful attack, or top attacker, of class C.
The following result provides soundness criteria for attack
tolerance and attack vulnerability.
Theorem 1 (Soundness criteria). Let M be an honest and
sound CPS, C an arbitrary class of attacks, and A an attack
of a class C ′, with C ′  C.
• If M ‖ Top(C) v M then M ‖ A v M .
• If M ‖ Top(C) vm1..n1 M then either M ‖ A vM or
M ‖ A vm2..n2 M , with m2..n2 ⊆ m1..n1.
Corollary 1. Let M be an honest and sound CPS, and C a
class of attacks. If Top(C) is not lethal for M then any attack
A of class C ′, with C ′  C, is not a lethal attack for M . If
Top(C) is not a permanent attack for M then any attack A
of class C ′, with C ′  C, is not a permanent attack for M .
IV. IMPACT OF AN ATTACK
In the previous section, we have grouped cyber-physical
attacks by focussing on the physical devices under attack
and the timing aspects of the attack (Definition 10). Then,
we have provided a formalisation of when a CPS should be
considered tolerant/vulnerable to an attack (Definition 11). In
this section, we show that it is important not only to demonstrate
the tolerance (or vulnerability) of a CPS with respect to certain
attacks, but also to evaluate the disruptive impact of those
attacks on the CPS [7].
The goal of this section is twofold: to provide a metric to
estimate the impact of a successful attack on a CPS, and to
investigate possible quantifications of the chances for an attack
of being successful when attacking a CPS.
As to the metric, we focus on the ability that an attack may
have to drag a CPS out of the correct behaviour modelled by
its evolution map, with the given uncertainty. Recall that evol
is monotone with respect to the uncertainty. Thus, an increase
of the uncertainty may translate into a widening of the range
of the possible behaviours of the CPS.
Fig. 3. Simulation of Sys[δ ← 19
20
].
In the following, for M = EonS P , we write M [ψ ← ψ′]
to mean E[ψ ← ψ′]onS P .
Proposition 7 (Monotonicity). Let M = EonS P be an honest
and sound CPS, and ξw the uncertainty of E. If ξw ≤ ξ′w and
M
t−−→M ′ then M [ξw ← ξ′w]
t−−→M ′[ξw ← ξ′w].
However, a wider uncertainty in the model doesn’t always
correspond to a widening of the possible behaviours of the
CPS. In fact, this depends on the intrinsic tolerance of a CPS
with respect to changes in the uncertainty function.
Definition 14 (System ξ-tolerance). An honest and sound CPS
M = EonS P , where ξw is the uncertainty of E, is ξ-tolerant,
for ξ ∈ RXˆ and ξ ≥ 0, if
ξ = sup
{
ξ′ : M [ξw ← ξw+η] vM, for any 0 ≤ η ≤ ξ′
}
.
Intuitively, if a CPS M has been designed with a given
uncertainty ξw, but M is actually ξ-tolerant, with ξ > 0,
then the uncertainty ξw is somehow underestimated: the real
uncertainty of M is given by ξw+ξ. This information is quite
important when trying to estimate the impact of an attack on
a CPS. In fact, if a system M has been designed with a given
uncertainty ξw, but M is actually ξ-tolerant, with ξ > 0, then
an attack has (at least) a “room for maneuver” ξ to degrade the
whole CPS without being observed (and hence detected). Thus,
in general, the tolerance ξ should be as small as possible.
Let Sys be the CPS of Example 2. In the rest of the section,
with an abuse of notation, we will write Sys[δ ← γ] to denote
Sys where the uncertainty of the variable temp is γ.
Example 6. The CPS Sys of Example 2 is 120 -tolerant. This
because, sup
{
ξ′ : Sys[δ ← δ+η] v Sys, for 0 ≤ η ≤ ξ′} is
equal to 120 . Since δ + ξ =
8
20 +
1
20 =
9
20 , the proof of this
statement relies on the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Let Sys be the CPS of Example 2. Then:
• Sys[δ ← γ] v Sys , for γ ∈ ( 820 , 920 ),
• Sys[δ ← γ] 6v Sys , for γ > 920 .
Figure 3 shows an evolution of Sys[δ ← 2930 ]: the red box
denotes a violation of the safety conditions because the cooling
cycle wasn’t sufficient to drop the (sensed) temperature below
10 (here, the controller imposes 5 further time units of cooling).
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Everything is in place to define our metric to estimate the
impact of an attack.
Definition 15 (Impact). Let M = EonS P be an honest and
sound CPS, where ξw is the uncertainty of E. We say that an
attack A has definitive impact ξ on the system M if
ξ = inf
{
ξ′ : ξ′ ∈ RXˆ ∧ ξ′>0 ∧M ‖ A vM [ξw ← ξw+ξ′]
}
.
It has pointwise impact ξ on the system M at time m if
ξ= inf
{
ξ′ : ξ′∈RXˆ ∧ M ‖ A vm..n M [ξw ← ξw+ξ′], n∈N∪∞
}
.
Intuitively, with this definition, we can establish either the
definitive (and hence maximum) impact of the attack A on the
system M , or the impact at a specific time m. In the latter
case, by definition of vm..n, there are two possibilities: either
the impact of the attack keeps growing after time m, or in the
time interval m+1, the system under attack deadlocks.
The impact of Top(C) provides an upper bound for the
impact of all attacks of class C ′, with C ′  C.
Theorem 2 (Top attacker’s impact). Let M be an honest and
sound CPS, and C an arbitrary class of attacks. Let A be an
attack of class C ′, with C ′  C.
• The definitive impact of Top(C) on M is greater than or
equal to the definitive impact of A on M .
• If Top(C) has pointwise impact ξ on M at time m, and A
has pointwise impact ξ′ on M at time m′, with m′ ≤ m,
then ξ′ ≤ ξ.
Example 7. Let us consider the attack A of Example 4. Then,
A has a definitive impact of 8.5 on the CPS Sys defined in
Example 2. Formally, 8.5 = inf
{
ξ′ : ξ′ > 0 ∧ Sys ‖ A v
Sys[δ ← δ+ξ′]}. Here, the attack can prevent the activation
of the cooling system, and the temperature will keep growing
until the CPS before enters continuously in an unsafe state
and eventually deadlocks. Since δ + ξ = 0.4 + 8.5 = 8.9, the
proof of this statement relies on the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Let Sys be the CPS defined in Example 2, and
A be the attack defined in Example 7. Then:
• Sys ‖ A 6v Sys[δ ← γ], for γ ∈ (0.4, 8.9),
• Sys ‖ A v Sys[δ ← γ], for γ > 8.9.
Definition 15 provided an instrument to estimate the impact
of a successful attack. However, there is at least another
question that a CPS designer could ask: “Is there a way to
estimate the chances that an attack will be successful during
the execution of my CPS?” To paraphrase in a more operational
manner: how many execution traces of my CPS are prone to
be attacked by a specific attack?
For instance, consider again the simple attack Am proposed
in Example 3:
idlem−1.timeoutbread Ecool(x).if (x=off) {write Ecool〈off〉}c.
Here, in the m-th time slot the attack tries to eavesdrop a
command to turn on the cooling. The attack is very quick and
condensed in a single time slot. The question is: what are the
chances of success of such a quick attack?
Fig. 4. A quantitative analysis of the attack of Example 3.
Figure 4 provides a representation of an experiment in
MATLAB where we launched 10000 executions of our CPS in
isolation, lasting 700 time units each. From the aggregated data
contained in this graphic, we note that after a transitory phase
(whose length depends on several things: the uncertainty δ, the
initial state of the system, the length of the cooling activity,
etc.) that lasts around 300 time slots, the rate of success of
the attack Am is around 10%. The reader may wonder why
exactly the 10%. This depends on the periodicity of our CPS,
as in average the cooling is activated every 10 time slots.
This example shows that, as pointed out in [8], the effec-
tiveness of a cyber-physical attack depends on the information
the attack has about the functionality of the whole CPS. For
instance, if the attacker were not aware of the exact periodicity
of the CPS, she might try, if possible, to repeat the attack on
more consecutive time slots. In this case, the left graphic of
Figure 5 says that the rate of success of the attack increases
linearly with the length of the attack itself (data obtained by
attacking the CPS after the transitory period). Thus, if the
attack of Example 3 were iterated for 10 time slots, say
A10m = idle
m−1.B10
Bi = timeoutbread Ecool(x).if (x = off)
{write Ecool〈off〉.idle.Bi−1}cBi−1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10
with B0 = nil, the rate of success would be almost 100%.
Finally, consider a generalisation of the attack of Example 5:
Ak0 = nil
Akn = timeoutbread Est(x).timeoutbwrite Est〈x−k〉.
idle.Akn−1cAkn−1cAkn−1
for 1 ≤ n ≤ 15 and 2 ≤ k ≤ 10. Here, the attack decreases
the sensed temperature of an offset k. Now, suppose to launch
this attack after, say, 300 time slots (i.e., after the transitory
phase). Formally, we define the attack: Bkn = idle
300.Akn. In
this case, the right graphic of Figure 5 provides a graphical
representation of the percentage of alarms on 5000 execution
traces lasting 100 time units each. Thus, for instance, an attack
lasting n = 8 time units with an offset k = 5 affects around
40% of the execution traces of the CPS.
V. CONCLUSIONS, RELATED AND FUTURE WORK
We have provided formal theoretical foundations to reason
about and statically detect attacks to physical devices of CPSs.
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Fig. 5. A quantitative analysis of two different attacks.
To that end, we have proposed a hybrid process calculus, called
CCPSA, as a formal specification language to model physical
and cyber components of CPSs as well as cyber-physical attacks.
Based on CCPSA and its labelled transition semantics, we
have formalised a threat model for CPSs by grouping attacks
in classes, according to the target physical devices and two
timing parameters: begin and duration of the attacks. Then,
we relied on the trace semantics of CCPSA to assess attack
tolerance/vulnerability with respect to a given attack. Along
the lines of GNDC [6], we defined a notion of top attacker,
Top(C), of a given class of attacks C, which has been used to
provide sufficient criteria to prove attack tolerance/vulnerability
to all attacks of class C (and weaker ones). Here, would like
to mention that in our companion paper [2] we developed a
bisimulation congruence for a simpler version of the calculus
where security features have been completely stripped off.
For simplicity, in the current submission, we adopted as
main behavioural equivalence trace equivalence instead of
bisimulation. We could switch to a bisimulation semantics,
preserved by parallel composition, which would allow us to
scale our verification method (Theorem 1) to bigger systems.
Finally, we have provided a metric to estimate the impact
of a successful attack on a CPS together with possible
quantifications of the success chances of an attack. We proved
that the impact of the most powerful attack Top(C) represents
an upper bound for the impact of any attack A of class
C (and weaker ones).
We have illustrated our concepts by means of a running
example, focusing in particular on a formal treatment of both
integrity and DoS attacks to sensors and actuators of CPSs.
Our example is simple but far from trivial and designed to
describe a wide number of attacks.
Related work: Among the 118 papers discussed in the
comprehensive survey [24], 50 adopt a discrete notion of time
similar to ours, 13 a continuous one, 48 a quasi-static time
model, and the rest use a hybrid time model. Most of these
papers investigate attacks on CPSs and their protection by
relying on simulation test systems to validate the results.
We focus on the papers that are most related to our work.
Huang et al. [10] were among the first to propose threat models
for CPSs. Along with [11], [12], they stressed the role played
by timing parameters on integrity and DoS attacks. Alternative
threat models are discussed in [7], [8], [19]. In particular,
Gollmann et al. [8] discussed possible goals (equipment
damage, production damage, compliance violation) and stages
(access, discovery, control, damage, cleanup) of cyber-physical
attacks. In the current paper, we focused on the damage stage,
where the attacker already has a rough idea of the plant and
the control architecture of the target CPS.
A number of works use formal methods for CPS security,
although they apply methods, and most of the time have goals,
that are quite different from ours.
Burmester et al. [3] employed hybrid timed automata to
give a threat framework based on the traditional Byzantine
faults model for crypto-security. However, as remarked in [19],
cyber-physical attacks and faults have inherently distinct
characteristics. Faults are considered as physical events that
affect the system behaviour, where simultaneous events don’t
act in a coordinated way; cyber-attacks may be performed over
a significant number of attack points and in a coordinated way.
In [21], Vigo presented an attack scenario that addresses
some of the peculiarities of a cyber-physical adversary, and
discussed how this scenario relates to other attack models
popular in the security protocol literature. Then, in [22], [23]
Vigo et al. proposed an untimed calculus of broadcasting
processes equipped with notions of failed and unwanted
communication. These works differ quite considerably from
ours, e.g., they focus on DoS attacks without taking into
consideration timing aspects or impact of the attack.
Cómbita et al. [4] and Zhu and Basar [25] applied game
theory to capture the conflict of goals between an attacker who
seeks to maximise the damage inflicted to a CPS’s security
and a defender who aims to minimise it [13].
Finally, there are three recent papers that were developed in
parallel to ours: [14], [16], [17]. Rocchetto and Tippenhaur [16]
introduced a taxonomy of the diverse attacker models proposed
for CPS security and outline requirements for generalised
attacker models; in [17], they then proposed an extended
Dolev-Yao attacker model suitable for CPSs. In their approach,
physical layer interactions are modelled as abstract interactions
between logical components to support reasoning on the
physical-layer security of CPSs. This is done by introducing
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additional orthogonal channels. Time is not represented.
Nigam et al. [14] work around the notion of Timed Dolev-
Yao Intruder Models for Cyber-Physical Security Protocols by
bounding the number of intruders required for the automated
verification of such protocols. Following a tradition in security
protocol analysis, they provide an answer to the question: How
many intruders are enough for verification and where should
they be placed? They also extend the strand space model to
CPS protocols by allowing for the symbolic representation of
time, so that they can use the tool Maude [15] along with SMT
support. Their notion of time is however different from ours,
as they focus on the time a message needs to travel from an
agent to another. The paper does not mention physical devices,
such as sensors and/or actuators.
Future work: While much is still to be done, we believe
that our paper provides a stepping stone for the development
of formal and automated tools to analyse the security of CPSs.
We will consider applying, possibly after proper enhancements,
existing tools and frameworks for automated security protocol
analysis, resorting to the development of a dedicated tool if
existing ones prove not up to the task. We will also consider
further security properties and concrete examples of CPSs, as
well as other kinds of cyber-physical attackers and attacks,
e.g., periodic attacks. This will allow us to refine the classes
of attacks we have given here (e.g., by formalising a type
system amenable to static analysis), and provide a formal
definition of when a CPS is more secure than another so as to
be able to design, by progressive refinement, secure variants
of a vulnerable CPSs.
We also aim to extend the preliminary quantitative analysis
we have given here by developing a suitable behavioural theory
ensuring that our trace semantics considers also the probability
of a trace to actually occur. We expect that the discrete time
stochastic hybrid systems of [1] will be useful to that extent.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of § II
In order to prove Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, we use
the following lemma that formalises the invariant properties
binding the state variable temp with the activity of the cooling
system.
Intuitively, when the cooling system is inactive the value
of the state variable temp lays in the real interval [0, 11.5].
Furthermore, if the coolant is not active and the variable temp
lays in the real interval (10.1, 11.5], then the cooling will be
turned on in the next time slot. Finally, when active the cooling
system will remain so for k ∈ 1..5 time slots (counting also
the current time slot) with the variable temp being in the real
interval (9.9− k∗(1+δ), 11.5− k∗(1−δ)].
Lemma 1. Let Sys be the system defined in Example 2. Let
Sys = Sys1
t1−−→ idle−−−→ Sys2 t2−−→ idle−−−→ · · ·
tn−1−−−−−→ idle−−−→ Sysn
such that the traces tj contain no idle-actions, for any j ∈
1..n−1, and for any i ∈ 1..n, Sysi = EionPi with Ei =
〈ξix, ξiu, δ, evol , ,meas, inv〉. Then, for any i ∈ 1..n−1, we
have the following:
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1) if ξiu(cool) = off then ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ [0, 11.1 + δ];
with ξix(stress) = 0 if ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ [0, 10.9 + δ], and
ξix(stress) = 1, otherwise;
2) if ξiu(cool) = off and ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ (10.1, 11.1 + δ] then,
in the next time slot, ξi+1u (cool) = on and ξ
i+1
x (stress) ∈
1..2;
3) if ξiu(cool) = on then ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ (9.9−k∗(1+δ), 11.1+
δ − k∗(1−δ)], for some k ∈ 1..5 such that ξi−ku (cool) =
off and ξi−ju (cool) = on, for j ∈ 0..k−1; moreover, if k ∈
1..3 then ξix(stress) ∈ 1..k+1, otherwise, ξix(stress) = 0.
Proof. Let us write vi and si to denote the values of the state
variables temp and stress , respectively, in the systems Sysi ,
i.e., ξix(temp) = vi and ξ
i
x(stress) = si. Moreover, we will
say that the coolant is active (resp., is not active) in Sysi if
ξiu(cool) = on (resp., ξ
i
u(cool) = off).
The proof is by mathematical induction on n, i.e., the number
of idle-actions of our traces.
The case base n = 1 follows directly from the definition of
Sys .
Let us prove the inductive case. We assume that the three
statements hold for n− 1 and prove that they also hold for n.
1) Let us assume that the cooling is not active in Sysn . In this
case, we prove that vn ∈ [0, 11.1 + δ], with and sn = 0
if vn ∈ [0, 10.9 + δ], and sn = 1 otherwise.
We consider separately the cases in which the coolant is
active or not in Sysn−1
• Suppose the coolant is not active in Sysn−1 (and not
active in Sysn ).
By the induction hypothesis we have vn−1 ∈ [0, 11.1+
δ]; with sn−1 = 0 if vn−1 ∈ [0, 10.9+δ], and sn−1 = 1
otherwise. Furthermore, if vn−1 ∈ (10.1, 11.1+δ], then,
by the induction hypothesis, the coolant must be active
in Sysn . Since we know that in Sysn the cooling is
not active, it follows that vn−1 ∈ [0, 10.1] and sn = 0.
Furthermore, in Sysn the temperature will increase of a
value laying in the real interval [1−δ, 1+δ] = [0.6, 1.4].
Thus, vn will be in [0.6, 11.1 + δ] ⊆ [0, 11.1 + δ].
Moreover, if vn−1 ∈ [0, 9.9], then the state variable
stress is not incremented and hence sn = 0 with vn ∈
[0+1−δ , 9.9+1+δ] = [0.6 , 10.9+δ] ⊆ [0 , 10.9+δ].
Otherwise, if vn−1 ∈ (9.9, 10.1], then the state variable
stress is incremented, and hence sn = 1.
• Suppose the coolant is active in Sysn−1 (and not active
in Sysn ).
By the induction hypothesis, vn−1 ∈ (9.9 − k ∗ (1 +
δ), 11.1 + δ − k ∗ (1− δ)] for some k ∈ 1..5 such that
the coolant is not active in Sysn−1−k and is active in
Sysn−k , . . . ,Sysn−1 .
The case k ∈ {1, . . . , 4} is not admissible. In fact if
k ∈ {1, . . . , 4} then the coolant would be active for
less than 5 idle-actions as we know that Sysn is not
active. Hence, it must be k = 5. Since δ = 0.4 and
k = 5, it holds that vn−1 ∈ (9.9 − 5 ∗ 1.4, 11.1 +
0.4 − 5 ∗ 0.6] = (2.8, 8.6] and sn−1 = 0. Moreover,
since the coolant is active for 5 time slots, in Sysn−1
the controller and the IDS synchronise together via
channel sync and hence the IDS checks the temperature.
Since vn−1 ∈ (2.8, 8.6] the IDS process sends to the
controller a command to stop the cooling, and the
controller will switch off the cooling system. Thus,
in the next time slot, the temperature will increase of
a value laying in the real interval [1 − δ, 1 + δ] =
[0.6, 1.4]. As a consequence, in Sysn we will have
vn ∈ [2.8 + 0, 6, 8.6 + 1.4] = [3.4, 10] ⊆ [0, 11.1 + δ].
Moreover, since vn−1 ∈ (2.8, 8.6] and sn−1 = 0, we
derive that the state variable stress is not increased and
hence sn = 0, with vn ∈ [3.4, 10] ⊆ [0, 10.9 + δ].
2) Let us assume that the coolant is not active in Sysn and
vn ∈ (10.1, 11.1+δ]; we prove that the coolant is active in
Sysn+1 with sn+1 ∈ 1..2. Since the coolant is not active
in Sysn , then it will check the temperature before the next
time slot. Since vn ∈ (10.1, 11.1+δ] and  = 0.1, then the
process Ctrl will sense a temperature greater than 10 and
the coolant will be turned on. Thus, the coolant will be
active in Sysn+1 . Moreover, since vn ∈ (10.1, 11.1 + δ],
and sn could be either 0 or 1, the state variable stress is
increased and therefore sn+1 ∈ 1..2.
3) Let us assume that the coolant is active in Sysn ; we prove
that vn ∈ (9.9 − k ∗ (1 + δ), 11.1 + δ − k ∗ (1 − δ)] for
some k ∈ 1..5 and the coolant is not active in Sysn−k
and active in Sysn−k+1 , . . . ,Sysn . Moreover, we have to
prove that if k ≤ 3 then sn ∈ 1..k+1, otherwise, if k > 3
then sn = 0.
We prove the first statement. That is, we prove that vn ∈
(9.9−k∗(1+δ), 11.1+δ−k∗(1−δ)], for some k ∈ 1..5,
and the coolant is not active in Sysn−k , whereas it is active
in the systems Sysn−k+1 , . . . ,Sysn .
We separate the case in which the coolant is active in
Sysn−1 from that in which is not active.
• Suppose the coolant is not active in Sysn−1 (and active
in Sysn ).
In this case k = 1 as the coolant is not active in Sysn−1
and it is active in Sysn . Since k = 1, we have to prove
vn ∈ (9.9− (1 + δ), 11.1 + δ − (1− δ)].
However, since the coolant is not active in Sysn−1 and
is active in Sysn it means that the coolant has been
switched on in Sysn−1 because the sensed temperature
was above 10 (since  = 0.1 this may happen only if
vn−1 > 9.9). By the induction hypothesis, since the
coolant is not active in Sysn−1 , we have that vn−1 ∈
[0, 11.1 + δ]. Therefore, from vn−1 > 9.9 and vn−1 ∈
[0, 11.1 + δ] it follows that vn−1 ∈ (9.9, 11.1 + δ].
Furthermore, since the coolant is active in Sysn , the
temperature will decrease of a value in [1− δ, 1 + δ]
and therefore vn ∈ (9.9− (1 + δ), 11.1 + δ − (1− δ)],
which concludes this case of the proof.
• Suppose the coolant is active in Sysn−1 (and active in
Sysn as well).
By the induction hypothesis, there is h ∈ 1..5 such that
vn−1 ∈ (9.9− h ∗ (1 + δ), 11.1 + δ − h ∗ (1− δ)] and
14
the coolant is not active in Sysn−1−h and is active in
Sysn−h , . . . ,Sysn−1 .
The case h = 5 is not admissible. In fact, since δ = 0.4,
if h = 5 then vn−1 ∈ (9.9 − 5 ∗ 1.4, 11.1 + δ − 5 ∗
0.6] = (2.8, 8.6]. Furthermore, since the cooling system
has been active for 5 time instants, in Sysn−1 the
controller and the IDS synchronise together via channel
sync, and the IDS checks the received temperature.
As vn−1 ∈ (2.8, 8.6], the IDS sends to the controller
via channel ins the command stop. This implies that
the controller should turn off the cooling system, in
contradiction with the hypothesis that the coolant is
active in Sysn .
Hence, it must be h ∈ 1..4. Let us prove that for
k = h + 1 we obtain our result. Namely, we have to
prove that, for k = h + 1, (i) vn ∈ (9.9 − k ∗ (1 +
δ), 11.1 + δ − k ∗ (1− δ)], and (ii) the coolant is not
active in Sysn−k and active in Sysn−k+1 , . . . ,Sysn .
Let us prove the statement (i). By the induction
hypothesis, it holds that vn−1 ∈ (9.9 − h ∗ (1 +
δ), 11.1 + δ − h ∗ (1 − δ)]. Since the coolant is
active in Sysn , the temperature will decrease Hence,
vn ∈ (9.9−(h+1)∗(1+δ), 11.1+δ−(h+1)∗(1−δ)].
Therefore, since k = h + 1, we have that vn ∈
(9.9− k ∗ (1 + δ), 11.1 + δ − k ∗ (1− δ)].
Let us prove the statement (ii). By the induction
hypothesis the coolant is not active in Sysn−1−h and
it is active in Sysn−h , . . . ,Sysn−1 . Now, since the
coolant is active in Sysn , for k = h+ 1, we have that
the coolant is not active in Sysn−k and is active in
Sysn−k+1 , . . . ,Sysn , which concludes this case of the
proof.
Thus, we have proved that vn ∈ (9.9− k ∗ (1+ δ), 11.1+
δ − k ∗ (1 − δ)], for some k ∈ 1..5; moreover, the
coolant is not active in Sysn−k and active in the systems
Sysn−k+1 , . . . ,Sysn .
It remains to prove that sn ∈ 1..k+1 if k ≤ 3, and sn = 0,
otherwise.
By inductive hypothesis, since the coolant is not active in
Sysn−k , we have that sn−k ∈ 0..1. Now, for k ∈ [1..2],
the temperature could be greater than 9.9. Hence if the
state variable stress is either increased or reset, then
sn ∈ 1..k+1, for k ∈ 1..3. Moreover, since for k ∈ 3..5
the temperature is below 9.9, it follows that sn = 0 for
k > 3.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since δ = 0.4, by Lemma 1 the value
of the state variable temp is always in the real interval [0, 11.5].
As a consequence, the invariant of the system is never violated
and the system never deadlocks. Moreover, after 5 time units
of cooling, the state variable temp is always in the real interval
(9.9 − 5 ∗ 1.4, 11.1 + 0.4 − 5 ∗ 0.6] = (2.9, 8.5]. Hence, the
process IDS will never transmit on the channel alarm .
Finally, by Lemma 1 the maximum value reached by the
state variable stress is 4 and therefore the system does not
reach unsafe states.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us prove the two statements sepa-
rately.
• Since  = 0.1, if process Ctrl senses a temperature above
10 (and hence Sys turns on the cooling) then the value of
the state variable temp is greater than 9.9. By Lemma 1,
the value of the state variable temp is always less than or
equal to 11.1+ δ. Therefore, if Ctrl senses a temperature
above 10, then the value of the state variable temp is in
(9.9, 11.1 + δ].
• By Lemma 1 (third item), the coolant can be active for
no more than 5 time slots. Hence, by Lemma 1, when
Sys turns off the cooling system the state variable temp
ranges over (9.9− 5 ∗ (1 + δ), 11.1 + δ − 5 ∗ (1− δ)].
B. Proofs of § III
Proof of Proposition 4. We distinguish the two cases, depend-
ing on m.
• Let m ≤ 8. We recall that the cooling system is activated
only when the sensed temperature is above 10. Since
 = 0.1, when this happens the state variable temp must
be at least 9.9. Note that after m−1 ≤ 7 idle-actions,
when the attack tries to interact with the controller of
the actuator cool , the variable temp may reach at most
7 ∗ (1 + δ) = 7 ∗ 1.4 = 9.8 degrees. Thus, the cooling
system will not be activated and the attack will not have
any effect.
• Let m > 8. By Proposition 2, the system Sys in isolation
may never deadlock, it does not get into an unsafe state,
and it may never emit an output on channel alarm . Thus,
any execution trace of the system Sys consists of a
sequence of τ -actions and idle-actions.
In order to prove the statement it is enough to show the
following four facts:
– the system Sys ‖ Am may not deadlock in the first
m+ 3 time slots;
– the system Sys ‖ Am may not emit any output in the
first m+ 3 time slots;
– the system Sys ‖ Am may not enter in an unsafe state
in the first m+ 3 time slots;
– the system Sys ‖ Am has a trace reaching un unsafe
state from the (m+4)-th time slot on, and until the
invariant gets violated and the system deadlocks.
The first three facts are easy to show as the attack may
steal the command addressed to the actuator cool only
in the m-th time slot. Thus, until time slot m, the whole
system behaves correctly. In particular, by Proposition 2
and Proposition 3, no alarms, deadlocks or violations of
safety conditions occur, and the temperature lies in the
expected ranges. Any of those three actions requires at
least further 4 time slots to occur. Indeed, by Lemma 1,
when the cooling is switched on in the time slot m, the
variable stress might be equal to 2 and hence the system
might not enters in an unsafe state in the first m+3 time
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slots. Moreover, an alarm or a deadlock needs more than
3 time slots and hence no alarm can occur in the first
m+ 3 time slots.
Let us show the fourth fact, i.e., that there is a trace where
the system Sys ‖ Am enters into an unsafe state starting
from the (m+4)-th time slot and until the invariant gets
violated.
Firstly, we prove that for all time slots n, with 9 ≤ n < m,
there is a trace of the system Sys ‖ Am in which the state
variable temp reaches the values 10.1 in the time slot n.
The fastest trace reaching the temperature of 10.1 degrees
requires d 10.11+δ e = d 10.11.4 e = 8 time units, whereas the
slowest one d 10.11−δ e = d 10.10.6 e = 17 time units. Thus, for
any time slot n, with 9 ≤ n ≤ 18, there is a trace of the
system where the value of the state variable temp is 10.1.
Now, for any of those time slots n there is a trace in which
the state variable temp is equal to 10.1 in all time slots
n+10i < m, with i ∈ N. Indeed, when the variable temp
is equal to 10.1 the cooling might be activated. Thus, there
is a trace in which the cooling system is activated. We can
always assume that during the cooling the temperature
decreases of 1 + δ degrees per time unit, reaching at the
end of the cooling cycle the value of 5. This entails that
the trace may continue with 5 time slots in which the
variable temp is increased of 1+ δ degrees per time unit;
reaching again the value 10.1. Thus, for all time slots n,
with 9 ≤ n < m, there is a trace of the system Sys ‖ Am
in which the state variable temp is 10.1 in n.
As a consequence, we can suppose that in the m−1-th
time slot there is a trace in which the value of the variable
temp is 10.1. Since  = 0.1, the sensed temperature lays
in the real interval [10, 10.2]. Let us focus on the trace in
which the sensed temperature is 10 and the cooling system
is not activated. In this case, in the m-th time slot the
system may reach a temperature of 10.1+ (1+ δ) = 11.5
degrees and the variable stress is 1.
The process Ctrl will sense a temperature above 10
sending the command cool!on to the actuator cool . Now,
since the attack Am is active in that time slot (m > 8),
the command will be stolen by the attack and it will
never reach the actuator. Without that dose of coolant,
the temperature of the system will continue to grow. As
a consequence, after further 4 time units of cooling, i.e.
in the m+4-th time slot, the value of the state variable
stress may be 5 and the system enters in an unsafe state.
After 1 time slots, in the time slot m+ 5, the controller
and the IDS synchronise via channel sync, the IDS will
detect a temperature above 10, and it will fire the output
on channel alarm saying to process Ctrl to keep cooling.
But Ctrl will not send again the command cool!on. Hence,
the temperature would continue to increase and the system
remains in an unsafe state while the process IDS will keep
sending of alarm(s) until the invariant of the environment
gets violated.
Proof of Proposition 5. By induction on the length of the trace.
In order to prove Proposition 6, we introduce Lemma 2.
This is a variant of Lemma 1 in which the CPS Sys runs in
parallel with the attack An defined in Example 5. Here, due to
the presence of the attack, the temperature is 2 degrees higher
when compared to the system Sys in isolation.
Lemma 2. Let Sys be the system defined in Example 2 and
An be the attack of Example 5. Let
Sys ‖ An = Sys1 t1−−→ idle−−−→ . . .Sysn−1
tn−1−−−−−→ idle−−−→ Sysn
such that the traces tj contain no idle-actions, for any j ∈
1..n−1, and for any i ∈ 1..n Sysi = EionPi with Ei =
〈ξix, ξiu, δ, evol , ,meas, inv〉. Then, for any i ∈ 1..n−1 we
have the following:
• if ξiu(cool) = off, then ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ [0, 11.1 + 2 + δ];
• if ξiu(cool) = off and ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ (10.1+2, 11.1+2+δ],
then we have ξi+1u (cool) = on;
• if ξiu(cool) = on, then ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ (9.9 + 2 − k ∗ (1 +
δ), 11.1+2+δ−k∗ (1−δ)], for some k ∈ 1..5, such that
ξi−ku (cool) = off and ξ
i−j
u (cool) = on, for j ∈ 0..k−1.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
Now, everything is in place to prove Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let us proceed by case analysis.
• Let 0 ≤ n ≤ 8. In the proof of Proposition 4, we remarked
that the system Sys in isolation may sense a temperature
greater than 10 only after 8 idle-actions, i.e., in the 9-th
time slot. However, the life of the attack is n ≤ 8, and in
the 9-th time slot the attack is already terminated. As a
consequence, starting from the 9-th time slot the system
will correctly sense the temperature and it will correctly
activate the cooling system.
• Let n = 9. The maximum value that may be reached by
the state variable temp after 8 idle-actions, i.e., in the 9-th
time slot, is 8∗(1+δ) = 8∗1.4 = 11.2. However, since in
the 9-th time slot the attack is still alive, the process Ctrl
will sense a temperature below 10 and the system will
move to the next time slot and the state variable stress
is incremented. Then, in the 10-th time slot, when the
attack is already terminated, the maximum temperature the
system may reach is 11.2+(1+δ) = 12.6 degrees and the
state variable stress is equal to 1. Thus, the process Ctrl
will sense a temperature greater than 10, activating the
cooling system and incrementing the state variable stress .
As a consequence, during the following 4 time units of
cooling, the value of the state variable temp will be at
most 12.6−4∗(1−δ) = 12.6−4∗0.6 = 10.2, and hence
in the 14-th time slot, the value of the state variable stress
is 5. As a consequence, the system will enter in an unsafe
state. In the 15-th time slot, the value of the state variable
stress is still equal to 5 and the system will still be in an
unsafe state. However, the value of the state variable temp
will be at most 12.6− 5 ∗ (1− δ) = 12.6− 5 ∗ 0.6 = 9.6
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which will be sensed by process IDS as at most 9.7
(sensor error  = 0.1). As a consequence, no alarm will be
turned on and the variable stress will be reset. Moreover,
the invariant will be obviously always preserved.
As in the current time slot the attack has already termi-
nated, from this point in time on, the system will behave
correctly with neither deadlocks or alarms.
• Let n ≥ 10. In order to prove that Sys ‖ An '[14,n+7]
Sys , it is enough to show that:
– the system Sys ‖ An does not deadlock;
– the system Sys ‖ An may not emit any output in the
first 13 time slots;
– there is a trace in which the system Sys ‖ An enters
in an unsafe state in the 14-th time slot;
– there is a trace in which the system Sys ‖ An is in an
unsafe state in the (n+7)-th time slot;
– the system Sys ‖ An does not have any execution trace
emitting an output along channel alarm or entering in
an unsafe state after the n+ 7-th time slot.
As regards the first fact, since δ = 0.4, by Lemma 2 the
temperature of the system under attack will always remain
in the real interval [0, 13.5]. Thus, the invariant is never
violated and the trace of the system under attack cannot
contain any deadlock-action. Moreover, when the attack
terminates, if the temperature is in [0, 9.9], the system will
continue his behaviour correctly, as in isolation. Otherwise,
since the temperature is at most 13.5, after a possible
sequence of cooling cycles, the temperature will reach a
value in the interval [0, 9.9], and again the system will
continue its behaviour correctly, as in isolation.
Concerning the second and the third facts, the proof is
analogous to that of case n = 9.
Concerning the fourth fact, firstly we prove that for all
time slots m, with 9 < m ≤ n, there is a trace of the
system Sys ‖ An in which the state variable temp reaches
the values 12 in the time slot m. Since the attack is alive
at that time, and  = 0.1, when the variable temp will
be equal to 12 the sensed temperature will lay in the real
interval [9.9, 10.1].
The fastest trace reaching the temperature of 12 degrees
requires d 121+δ e = d 121.4e = 9 time units, whereas the
slowest one d 121−δ e = d 120.6e = 20 time units. Thus, for
any time slot m, with 9 < m ≤ 21, there is a trace of
the system where the value of the state variable temp is
12. Now, for any of those time slots m there is a trace in
which the state variable temp is equal to 12 in all time
slots m + 10i < n, with i ∈ N. As already said, when
the variable temp is equal to 12 the sensed temperature
lays in the real interval [9.9, 10.1] and the cooling might
be activated. Thus, there is a trace in which the cooling
system is activated. We can always find a trace where
during the cooling the temperature decreases of 1 + δ
degrees per time unit, reaching at the end of the cooling
cycle the value of 5. Thus, the trace may continue with
5 time slots in which the variable temp is increased of
1 + δ degrees per time unit; reaching again the value 12.
Thus, for all time slots m, with 9 < m ≤ n, there is a
trace of the system Sys ‖ An in which the state variable
temp has value 12 in the time slot m.
Therefore, we can suppose that in the n-th time slot the
variable temp is equal to 12 and, since the maximum
increment of temperature is 1.4, the the variable stress is
at least equal to 1. Since the attack is alive and  = 0.1,
in the n-th time slot the sensed temperature will lay in
[9.9, 10.1]. We consider the case in which the sensed
temperature is less than 10 and hence the cooling is not
activated.
Thus, in the n+1-th time slot the system may reach a
temperature of 12+1+ δ = 13.4 degrees and the process
Ctrl will sense a temperature above 10, and it will activate
the cooling system. In this case, the variable stress will
be increased. As a consequence, after further 5 time units
of cooling, i.e. in the n+6-th time slot, the value of the
state variable temp may reach 13.5− 5 ∗ (1− δ) = 10.4
and the alarm will be fired and the variable stress will
be still equal to 5. Therefore, in the n+7-th time slot the
variable stress will be still equal to 5 and the system will
be in an unsafe state.
Concerning the fifth fact, by Lemma 2, in the n+1-th
time slot the attack will be terminated and the system
may reach a temperature that is, in the worst case, at most
13.5. Thus, the cooling system may be activated and the
variable stress will be increased. As a consequence, in
the n+7-th time slot, the value of the state variable temp
may be at most 13.5− 6 ∗ (1− δ) = 13.5− 6 ∗ 0.6 = 9.9
and the variable stress will be reset to 0. Thus, after the
n+ 7-th time slot, the system will behave correctly, as in
isolation.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we introduce the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. Let M be an honest and sound CPS, C a class
of attacks, and A an attack of an arbitrary class C ′  C.
Whenever M ‖ A t−−→M ′ ‖ A′, then
M ‖ Top(C) t−−→M ′ ‖
∏
ι∈I
Att(ι,#idle(t)+1, C(ι)) .
Proof. Let us denote with Toph(C) the attack process∏
ι∈I
Att(ι, h, C(ι)).
Obviously, Top1(C) = Top(C).
The proof is by mathematical induction on the length k of
the trace t.
Base case k = 1.
This means t = α, for some action α. We proceed by case
analysis on the action α.
• α = cv. Since the attacker A does not use a communica-
tion channel, from M ‖ A cv−−−→M ′ ‖ A′ we can derive
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that A = A′ and M
cv−−−→M ′. Hence by rules (Par) and
(Out), we derive M ‖ Top(C) cv−−−→ M ′ ‖ Top1(C) =
M ′ ‖ Top(C).
• α = cv. This case is similar to the previous one.
• α = τ . There are several sub-cases.
– Let M ‖ A τ−−→ M ′ ‖ A′ be derived by an
application of rule (SensReadSec). Since the attacker
A performs only malicious actions on physical devices,
from M ‖ A τ−−→M ′ ‖ A′ we can derive that A = A′
and P
s?v−−−→ P ′, for some processes P and P ′ such
that M = EonS P and M ′ = EonS P ′. Hence by an
application of rules (Par) and (SensReadSec) we derive
M ‖ Top(C) τ−−→M ′ ‖ Top1(C) =M ′ ‖ Top(C).
– Let M ‖ A τ−−→M ′ ‖ A′ be derived by an application
of rule (ActWriteSec). This case is similar to the previous
one.
– Let M ‖ A τ−−→M ′ ‖ A′ be derived by an application
of rule (SensReadUnSec). Since the attacker A performs
only malicious actions, from M ‖ A τ−−→ M ′ ‖ A′
we can derive that A = A′ and P
s?v−−−→ P ′ for some
processes P and P ’ such that M = EonS P and M ′ =
EonS P ′.
By considering rnd({true, false}) = false for any
process Att(ι, 1, C(ι)), we have that Top(C) can
perform only a idle action, and
Top(C)
Es!v−−−−→6 .
Hence by an application of rules (Par) and
(SensReadUnSec) we derive M ‖ Top(C) τ−−→ M ′ ‖
Top1(C) =M ′ ‖ Top(C).
– Let M ‖ A τ−−→M ′ ‖ A′ be derived by an application
of rule (ActWriteUnSec). This case is similar to the
previous one.
– Let M ‖ A τ−−→M ′ ‖ A′ be derived by an application
of rule (ESensRead E). Since M is sound it follows that
M =M ′ and A
Es?v−−−−→ A′. This entails 1 ∈ C ′(Es?) ⊆
C(Es?), and
Top(C)
Es?v−−−−→ Top1(C) = Top(C)
by assuming rnd({true, false}) = true for the process
Att(Es?, 1, C(Es?)). Hence, by an application of rules
(Par) and (ESensRead E) we derive M ‖ Top(C) τ−−→
M ′ ‖ Top1(C) =M ′ ‖ Top(C).
– Let M ‖ A τ−−→M ′ ‖ A′ be derived by an application
of rule (EActWrite E). Since M is sound it follows that
M = M ′ and A
Ea!v−−−−→ A′. As a consequence, 1 ∈
C ′(Ea!) ⊆ C(Ea!), and
Top(C)
Ea!v−−−−→ Top1(C) = Top(C)
by assuming rnd({true, false})=true and rnd(R)=v
for the process Att(Ea!, 1, C(Ea!)). Thus, by an ap-
plication of rules (Par) and (EActWrite E) we derive
M ‖ Top(C) τ−−→M ′ ‖ Top1(C) =M ′ ‖ Top(C).
– Let M ‖ A τ−−→M ′ ‖ A′ be derived by an application
of rule (Tau). Let M = EonS P and M ′ = E′onS P ′.
There are two possibilities: either (i) P ‖ A τ−−→ P ′ ‖
A′, or (ii) P ‖ A τ :p−−−→ P ′ ‖ A′.
In the case (i), by inspection of Table I and by definition
of attacker, it follows that A cannot perform τ -action
since A does not use channel communication and
performs only malicious actions. Hence P
τ−−→ P ′ and,
by an application of rules (Par) and (Tau), we derive
M ‖ Top(C) τ−−→M ′ ‖ Top1(C) =M ′ ‖ Top(C).
In the case (ii), since M is sound and A can performs
only malicious actions, we have that either (i) P
s?v−−−→
P ′ and A
Es!v−−−−→ A′ or, (ii) P a!v−−−→ P ′ and A Ea?v−−−−→
A′. We consider the case (i) P
s?v−−−→ P ′ and A Es!v−−−−→
A′; the case (ii) is similar. Since A
Es!v−−−−→ A′, we
derive 1 ∈ C ′(Es!) ⊆ C(Es!), and
Top(C)
Es!v−−−−→ Top1(C) = Top(C)
by assuming rnd({true, false})=true and rnd(R)=v
for the process Att(Es!, 1, C(Es!)). Thus, by an ap-
plication of rules (ESensWrite E) and (Tau) we derive
M ‖ Top(C) τ−−→M ′ ‖ Top1(C) =M ′ ‖ Top(C).
• α = idle. This implies that the transition M ‖ A idle−−−→
M ′ ‖ A′ is derived by an application of rule (Time). From
M ‖ A idle−−−→ M ′ ‖ A′ we derive M idle−−−→ M ′. Hence,
it suffices to prove that Top(C)
idle−−−→ Top2(C) and
M ‖ Top(C) τ−−→6 .
First, let us prove that Top(C)
idle−−−→ Top2(C). We
consider two cases: 1 ∈ C(ι) and 1 6∈ C(ι). Let 1 ∈
C(ι). The transition Att(ι, 1, C(ι))
idle−−−→ Att(ι, 2, C(ι))
can be derived by assuming rnd({true, false}) = false.
Moreover, since rnd({true, false}) = false the pro-
cess Att(ι, 1, C(ι)) can perform only a idle action. Let
1 6∈ C(ι). Also in this case the process Att(ι, 1, C(ι))
can perform only a idle action. As a consequence, e
Att(ι, 1, C(ι))
idle−−−→ Att(ι, 2, C(ι)). Thus,
Top(C)
idle−−−→ Top2(C) .
Let us prove now that M ‖ Top(C) τ−−→6 . Since M ‖
A
τ−−→6 it follows that M τ−−→6 . Moreover, since Top(C)
can perform only a idle action then, by definition of rule
(Time), it follows that M ‖ Top(C) τ−−→6 .
• α = deadlock. This case is not possible, because M ‖
A
deadlock−−−−−−−→M ′ ‖ A′ would entail M deadlock−−−−−−−→M ′. But
M is sound and it cannot deadlock.
• α = unsafe. Again, this case is not possible because M
is sound.
Inductive case: k > 1.
We have to prove that M ‖ A t−−→ M ′ ‖ A′ implies M ‖
Top(C)
t−−→M ′ ‖ Top#idle(t)+1(C).
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Since the length of t is greater than 1, it follows that t = t′α,
for some t′ and α. Hence, there are M ′′ and A′′ such that
M ‖ A t
′
−−→M ′′ ‖ A′′ α−−→M ′ ‖ A′ .
By the induction hypothesis, it follows that M ‖ Top(C) t
′
−−→
M ′′ ‖ Top#idle(t′)+1(C). To get the result it is enough
to show that M ′′ ‖ A′′ α−−→ M ′ ‖ A′ implies M ′′ ‖
Top#idle(t
′)+1(C)
α−−→M ′ ‖ Top#idle(t)+1(C). The reasoning
is similar to that followed in the base case, except for α =
deadlock and α = unsafe. We prove the case α = deadlock,
the other is similar.
Let M = EonS P . The transition M ′′ ‖ A deadlock−−−−−−−→M ′ ‖
A′ must be derived by an application of rule (Deadlock). This
implies that that M ′′ = M ′, A′′ = A′ and inv(E) = false.
Thus, by an application of rule (Deadlock) we derive
M ′′ ‖ Top#idle(t′)+1(C) deadlock−−−−−−−→M ′ ‖ Top#idle(t′)+1(C).
Since #idle(t) + 1 = #idle(t′) + #idle(deadlock) + 1 =
#idle(t′)+1 we have that M ′′ ‖ Top#idle(t′)+1(C) deadlock−−−−−−−→
M ′ ‖ Top#idle(t)+1(C). As required.
Everything is finally in place to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. The top attacker Top(C) can mimic any
execution trace of any attack A of class C ′, with C ′  C.
Thus, by Lemma 3, if M ‖ A t−−→, for some trace t, then
M ‖ Top(C) t−−→ as well.
For any M and A, either M ‖ A vM or M ‖ A vm2..n2
M , for some m2 and n2 (m2 = 1 and n2 = ∞ if the two
systems are completely unrelated). Suppose by contradiction
that M ‖ A 6v M and M ‖ A vm2..n2 M , with m2..n2 6⊆
m1..n1. There are two cases: either n1 =∞ or n1 ∈ N+.
If n1 = ∞ then m2 < m1. Since M ‖ A vm2..n2 M ,
by Definition 8 there is a trace t, with #idle(t) = m2−1,
such that M ‖ A t−−→ and M 6 tˆ==⇒. By Lemma 3, this entails
M ‖ Top(C) t−−→. Since M 6 tˆ==⇒ and #idle(t) = m2−1 < m1,
this contradicts M ‖ Top(C) vm1..n1 M .
If n1 ∈ N+ then m2 < m1 and/or n1 < n2, and we reason
as in the previous case.
C. Proofs of § IV
In order to prove Proposition 8, we need a couple of lemmas.
Lemma 4 is a variant of Lemma 1. Here the behaviour of
Sys is parametric on the uncertainty.
Lemma 4. Let Sys be the system defined in Example 2, and
0.4 < γ ≤ 920 . Let
Sys[δ ← γ] = Sys1 t1−−→ idle−−−→ Sys2 · · ·
tn−1−−−−−→ idle−−−→ Sysn
such that the traces tj contain no idle-actions, for any j ∈
1..n−1, and for any i ∈ 1..n Sysi = EionPi with Ei =
〈ξix, ξiu, γ, evol , ,meas, inv〉. Then, for any i ∈ 1..n−1 we
have the following:
• if ξiu(cool) = off then ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ [0, 11.1 + γ] and
ξix(stress) = 0 if ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ [0, 10.9+γ] and, otherwise,
ξix(stress) = 1;
• if ξiu(cool) = off and ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ (10.1, 11.1 + γ] then
ξi+1u (cool) = on and ξ
i+1
x (stress) ∈ 1..2;
• if ξiu(cool) = on then ξ
i
x(temp) ∈ (9.9−k∗(1+γ), 11.1+
γ−k∗(1−γ)], for some k ∈ 1..5, such that ξi−ku (cool) =
off and ξi−ju (cool) = on, for j ∈ 0..k−1; moreover, if k ∈
1..3 then ξix(stress) ∈ 1..k+1, otherwise, ξix(stress) = 0.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1. The crucial difference
w.r.t. the proof of Lemma 1 is limited to the second part of the
third item. In particular the part saying that ξix(stress) = 0,
when k ∈ 4..5. Now, after 3 time units of cooling, the state
variable stress lays in the integer interval 1..k+1 = 1..4. Thus,
in order to have ξix(stress) = 0, when k ∈ 4..5, the temperature
in the third time slot of the cooling must be less than or equal
to 9.9. However, from the first statement of the third item we
deduce that, in the third time slot of cooling, the state variable
temp reaches at most 11.1+ γ− 3 ∗ (1− γ) = 8.1+4γ. Thus,
Hence we have that 8.1 + 4γ ≤ 9.9 for γ ≤ 920 .
The following lemma is a variant of Proposition 2.
Lemma 5. Let Sys be the system defined in Example 2 and
γ such that 0.4 < γ ≤ 920 . If Sys[δ ← γ]
t−−→ Sys′, for some
t = α1 . . . αn, then αi ∈ {τ, idle}, for any i ∈ 1..n.
Proof. By Lemma 4, the temperature will always lay in the
real interval [0, 11.1 + γ]. As a consequence, since γ ≤ 920 ,
the system will never deadlock.
Moreover, after 5 idle action of coolant the state variable
temp is in (9.9 − 5 ∗ (1 + γ), 11.1 + γ − 5 ∗ (1 − γ)] =
(4.9− 5γ , 6.1 + 6γ]. Since  = 0.1, the value detected from
the sensor will be in the real interval (4.8−5γ , 6.2+6γ]. Thus,
the temperature sensed by IDS will be at most 6.2 + 6γ ≤
6.2 + 6 ∗ 920 ≤ 10, and no alarm will be fired.
Finally, the maximum value that can be reached by the state
variable stress is k+1m for k = 3. As a consequence, the
system will not reach an unsafe state.
The following Lemma is a variant of Proposition 3. Here
the behaviour of Sys is parametric on the uncertainty.
Lemma 6. Let Sys be the system defined in Example 2 and
γ such that 0.4 < γ ≤ 920 . Then, for any execution trace of
Sys[δ ← γ] we have the following:
• if either process Ctrl or process IDS senses a temperature
above 10 then the value of the state variable temp ranges
over (9.9, 11.1 + γ];
• when the process IDS tests the temperature the value
of the state variable temp ranges over (9.9 − 5 ∗ (1 +
γ), 11.1 + γ − 5 ∗ (1− γ)].
Proof. As to the first statement, since  = 0.1, if either process
Ctrl or process IDS senses a temperature above 10 then the
value of the state variable temp is above 9.9. By Lemma 4,
the state variable temp is less than or equal to 11.1 + γ.
Therefore, if either process Ctrl or process IDS sense a
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temperature above 10 then the value of the state variable temp
is in (9.9, 11.1 + γ].
Let us prove now the second statement. When the process
IDS tests the temperature then the coolant has been active for
5 idle actions. By Lemma 4, the state variable temp ranges
over (9.9− 5 ∗ (1 + γ), 11.1 + γ − 5 ∗ (1− γ)].
Everything is finally in place to prove Proposition 8.
Proof of Proposition 8. For (1) we have to show that Sys[δ ←
γ] v Sys , for γ ∈ ( 820 , 920 ). But this obviously holds by
Lemma 5.
As regards item (2), we have to prove that Sys[δ ← γ] 6v
Sys , for γ > 920 . By Proposition 2 it is enough to show that the
system Sys[δ ← γ] has a trace which either (i) sends an alarm,
or (ii) deadlocks, or (iii) enters in an unsafe state. We can
easily build up a trace for Sys[δ ← γ] in which, after 10 idle-
actions, in the 11-th time slot, the value of the state variable
temp is 10.1. In fact, it is enough to increase the temperature
of 1.01 degrees for the first 10 rounds. Notice that this is an
admissible value since, 1.01 ∈ [1− γ, 1 + γ], for any γ > 920 .
Being 10.1 the value of the state variable temp, there is an
execution trace in which the sensed temperature is 10 (recall
that  = 0.1) and hence the cooling system is not activated
but the state variable stress will be increased. In the following
time slot, i.e., the 12-th time slot, the temperature may reach
at most the value 10.1 + 1 + γ and the state variable stress
is 1. Now, if 10.1 + 1 + γ > 50 then the system deadlocks.
Otherwise, the controller will activate the cooling system, and
after 3 time units of cooling, in the 15-th time slot, the state
variable stress will be 4 and the variable temp will be at most
11.1 + γ − 3(1− γ) = 8.1 + 4γ. Thus, there is an execution
trace in which the temperature is 8.1 + 4γ, which will be
greater than 9.9 being γ > 920 . As a consequence, in the next
time slot, the state variable stress will be 5 and the system
will enter in an unsafe state.
This is enough to derive that Sys[δ ← γ] 6v Sys , for
γ > 920 .
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider the case of the definitive impact.
By Lemma 3, if M ‖ A t−−→ then M ‖ Top(C) t−−→.
This entails M ‖ A v M ‖ Top(C). Thus, if M ‖
Top(C) v M [ξw ← ξw+ξ], for ξ ∈ RXˆ , ξ > 0, then
M ‖ A vM [ξw ← ξw+ξ], by transitivity of v.
The proof in the case of the pointwise impact is by
contradiction. Suppose ξ′ > ξ. Since Top(C) has a pointwise
impact ξ at time m, it follows that ξ is given by:
inf
{
ξ′′ : ξ′′∈RXˆ ∧ M ‖ Top(C) vm..n M [ξw ←
ξw+ξ
′′], n∈N∪∞}.
Similarly, since A has a pointwise impact ξ′ at time m′, it
follows that ξ′ is given by
inf
{
ξ′′ : ξ′′∈RXˆ ∧ M ‖ A vm′..n M [ξw ← ξw+ξ′′], n∈N∪∞
}
.
Now, if it were m = m′ then ξ ≥ ξ′ because M ‖ A t−−→
entails M ‖ Top(C) t−−→., by an application of Lemma 3. This
is contradiction with the fact that ξ < ξ′, Thus, it must be
m′ < m. Now, since both ξ and ξ′ are the infimum functions
and since ξ′ > ξ, there exist ξ and ξ′ such that ξ ≤ ξ ≤ ξ′ ≤ ξ′
and M ‖ Top(C) vm..n M [ξw ← ξw+ξ], for some n, and
M ‖ A vm′..n′ M [ξw ← ξw+ξ′], for some n′.
Hence, from M ‖ A vm′..n′ M [ξw ← ξw+ξ′], we
have that there exists a trace t with #idle(t) = m′ − 1
such that M ‖ A t−−→ and M [ξw ← ξw+ξ′] 6 tˆ==⇒. Since
ξ ≤ ξ′, by monotonicity (Proposition 7), we deduce that
M [ξw ← ξw+ξ] 6 tˆ==⇒. Moreover, by Lemma 3, M ‖ A t−−→
entails M ‖ Top(C) t−−→.
Summarising, there exists a trace t with #idle(t) = m′ − 1
such that M ‖ Top(C) t−−→ and M [ξw ← ξw+ξ] 6 tˆ==⇒.
However, this fact and m′ < m is in contradiction with
M ‖ Top(C) vm..n M [ξw ← ξw+ξ], for some n.
This is enough to derive the statement.
Proof of Proposition 9. Let us prove the first sub-result. As
demonstrated in Example 4, we know that Sys ‖ A v14..∞
Sys because in the 14-th time slot the compound system will
violate the safety conditions emitting an unsafe-action until
the invariant will be violated. No alarm will be emitted.
Since the system keeps violating the safety condition the
temperature must remain greater than 9.9. As proved for
Lemma 4 we can prove that we have that the temperature
is less than or equal to 10.1+γ. Hence, in the time slot before
getting in deadlock, the temperature of the system is in the
real interval (9.9, 10.1 + γ]. To deadlock with one idle action
and from a temperature in the real interval (9.9, 10.1 + γ],
either the temperature reaches a value greater than 50 (namely,
10.1+ γ+1+ γ > 50) or the temperature reaches a value less
than 0 (namely, 9.9− 1− γ < 0 ). Since γ ≤ 8.9, both cases
can not occur. Thus, we have that
Sys ‖ A 6v Sys[δ ← γ] .
Let us prove the second sub-result. That is,
Sys ‖ A v Sys[δ ← γ]
for γ > 8.9. We demonstrate that whenever Sys ‖ A t−−→, for
some trace t, then Sys[δ ← γ] tˆ==⇒ as well. We will proceed
by case analysis on the kind of actions contained in t. We
distinguish three possible cases.
• The trace t contains contains only τ -, idle-, unsafe- and
deadlock-actions. As discussed in Example 4, Sys ‖
A v14..∞ Sys because in the 14-th time slot the
system will violate the safety conditions emitting an
unsafe-action until the invariant will be broken. No
alarm will be emitted. Note that, when Sys ‖ A enters
in an unsafe state then the temperature is at most
9.9 + (1 + δ) + 5(1 + δ) = 9.9 + 6(1.4) = 18.3.
Moreover, the fastest execution trace, reaching an unsafe
state, deadlocks just after d 50−18.31+δ e = d 31,71.4 e = 23 idle-
actions. Hence, there are m,n ∈ N, with m ≥ 14 and
n ≥ m+23, such that the trace t of Sys ‖ A satisfies the
following conditions: (i) in the time interval 1..m− 1 the
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trace t of is composed by τ - and idle-actions; (ii) in the
time interval m..(n− 1), the trace t is composed by τ -,
idle- and unsafe- actions; in the n-th time slot the trace t
deadlocks.
By monotonicity (Proposition 7), it is enough to show
that such a trace exists for Sys[δ ← γ], with 8.9 < γ < 9.
In fact, if this trace exists for 8.9 < γ < 9, then it would
also exist for γ ≥ 9. In the following, we show how to
build the trace of Sys[δ ← γ] which simulates the trace
t of Sys ‖ A. We build up the trace in three steps: (i)
the sub-trace from time slot 1 to time slot m−6; (ii) the
sub-trace from the time slot m−5 to the time slot n−1;
(iii) the final part of the trace reaching the deadlock.
(i) As γ > 8.9 (and hence 1 + γ > 9.9), the system may
increment the temperature of 9.9 degrees after a single
idle-action. Hence, we choose the trace in which the
system Sys[δ ← γ], in the second time slot, reaches
the temperature equal to 9.9. Moreover, the system
may maintain this temperature value until the (m−6)-
th time slot (indeed 0 is an admissible increasing since
0 ∈ [1− γ, 1 + γ] ⊇ [−7.9, 10.9]) . Obviously, with a
temperature equal to 9.9, only τ - and idle-actions are
possible.
(ii) Let k ∈ R such that 0 < k < γ − 8.9 (such k exists
since γ > 8.9). We may consider an increment of the
temperature of k. This implies that in the (m−5)-th time
slot, the system Sys[δ ← γ] may reach the temperature
9.9 + k. Note that k is an admissible increment since
0 < k < γ − 8.9 and 8.9 < γ < 9 entails k ∈ (0, 0.1).
Moreover, the system may maintain this temperature
value until the (n−1)-th time slot (indeed, as said
before, 0 is an admissible increment). Summarising
from the (m−5)-th time slot to the (n−1)-th time slot,
the temperature may remain equal to 9.9+k ∈ (9.9, 10).
As a consequence, from the m-th time slot to the (n−1)-
th time slot the system Sys[δ ← γ] may enter in an
unsafe state (i.e., safe(E) = false). Thus, an unsafe-
action may be performed in the time interval m..(n−1).
Moreover, since  = 0.1 and the temperature is e
9.9 + k ∈ (9.9, 10), we can always assume that the
cooling is not activated until the (n−1)-th time slot.
This implies that neither alarm nor deadlock occur.
(iii) At this point, since in the (n−1)-th time slot the
temperature is equal to 9.9 + k ∈ (9.9, 10) (recall
that k ∈ (0, 1)), the cooling may be activated. We may
consider a decrement of 1 + γ. In this manner, in the
n-th time slot the system may reach a temperature of
9.9+k− (1+ γ) < 9.9+0− 1− 8.9 = 0 degrees, and
the system Sys[δ ← γ] will deadlock.
Summarising, for any γ > 8.9 the system Sys[δ ← γ]
can mimic any trace t of Sys ‖ A.
• The trace t contains contains only τ -, idle- and unsafe-
actions. This case is similar to the previous one.
• The trace t contains only τ -, idle- and alarm-actions. This
case cannot occur. In fact, as discussed in Example 4, the
process Ctrl never activates the Cooling component (and
hence also the IDS component, which is the only one
that could send an alarm) since it will always detect a
temperature below 10.
• The trace t contains only τ - and idle-actions. If the system
Sys ‖ A has a trace t that contains only τ - and idle-actions,
then, by Proposition 2, the system Sys in isolation must
have a similar trace with the same number of idle-actions.
By an application of Proposition 7, as δ < γ, any trace of
Sys can be simulated by Sys[δ ← γ]. As a consequence,
Sys[δ ← γ] tˆ==⇒.
This is enough to derive that:
Sys ‖ A v Sys[δ ← γ] ,
which concludes the proof.
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